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The methods and techniques for experiment development and integration
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Skylab was the most comprehensive mamlcd space program completed
to date, involvillg unprecedented numbers of experiments, government
agencies, contractors and supporting per'onnel. Ninety-four experiments,
plus several experimental operational instruments and twenty-six science
demonstrations, were developed, integrated with Skylab, and flown. A
majority of these were individua I experiments, although some (e.g.,
earth resources and space materials processing experiments) w_re associ-
ated with discipline-oriented lacilities provided for scienti ic users
by, Skylab. Experiment data gathered aboard Skylab was supplied to over
two hundred and fifty scientists from the United States and nineteen
other countries°
Tile many interfaces involved in the development and integration
of these experiments imposed new burdens upon tile "standard" methods
and techniques that llad evolved from earlier space programs. As a
result, many changes were made, and ma,_v lessons learned, throughout
the course of the Skylab Program. For example, new types of documen-
tation were established, design review and configuration management
techniques were improved and mission sdpport activities took on new
dimensions. This Experimenters' Reference records the Skylab c>perience
in experiment management, including lessons learned and recommendations
for improved cost-effec; ivcncss, to facilitate the transfer of this
k_owlcdgc to exp_rin_v'nters in future manned spac_ programs.
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I)EI:INI I'[ONS
Acceptance - An o[[ickal act by the Exl)crimcnt Dcw_lopment Ccnt_'-r to
accept tran.qlcr at accountability, title, and delivery of an elld item
of hardware t,r software, whether procured on contract or ill-house.
Acceptance Test - The fomual assessment or testi,ag accomplished [n
accordance with Part II of an end item specification to verify _he
performance, co0figuration, and manufacture of an end item (1) at the
time of its delivery and acceptance by the Gover_nt, or (2) for
delivery to another R_A Center.
Activation - lqae activities associated with originally placing an
orbital vehicle or ground fac lity in operationa; condition.
Baseline - An approved and defined tcchllical description providing a
poillt of departure for control o[ future ch_lllgt!So
Cluster - The orbital assembly constituting the complete configuration
lor manned Skvlab missions, inc|udillv all IllOdU[t'_ Of tile tlllmalllle(l
[abt.r;|torv plus a docked Conmland il|ltl Service Module.
) )
Crew Conq_._rtment Fit and Function (C-F-) - Ont' t_l Itl_' lill;ll c!lccl<-
outs pertorln ,tl durin,: hardware illtc_;r;ltioll. FI i_ht crew mtmfl)ers in-
Spt'ct tilt' Ca trier for propt, r harth,.arc integrati,ua, acct,ssLbtltty, and
sAl el\" ct_llsitit.r=l{ ions.
l)el. ix'crv - Th,.' pilv.q£cal translcr of hardware frolll one site to another.
lncludes trans[er _,f responstbit iCy for hardx,,arc cu._todianship (also
SCC ACOt'p t,lllCt' ) .
End item - An article o£ hardware or software which is deliw_rable, by
NASA or it contractor as a complete item as identified, defined and
schedu ted.
Experiment - A part of the payload devoted to the investigation of
scienti[tc or engineering phenomena. Sometimes used as sy,aon>_nous
with instrument; however, instrument generally refers only to the
operating [tight hardware, whereas experiment refers to the combina-
tion oi all associated hardware plus the use of the data to satisfy an
object Lye.
\i
IHigh-Fidelity Mockup - Training hardware that is essentially identical
to flight hardware in size, shape, and appearance and provides crew
interfaces (switches, etc.) but need not be operational.
Instrument - An item of hardware designed to perform a specific scientific
or engineering function in support of an experiment objective (also see
Experiment).
Snterface - A region common to two or more elements, systems, projects
or programs and characterized by mutual physical, functional, environ-
_ntal, operational, and/or procedural properties.
_tegration - Activities that are performed to assure physical and
functional compatibility of an experiment with other experiments, the
module, and the over_ll mission. Also _e physical _t£ng and testing
of a combined system (e.g. module and experiments).
Mission - A single spaceflight from launch to landing, and its objectives.
Module - A major element of the payload or spacecraft, which carries
experiments and support systems designed to meet mission objectives.
Near-Real Time - A short period of time, (normally within 24 hours)
after actual occurrence of a mission event.
Open Item - A question or problem which is unresolved, and requires
action to ensure its resolution.
Orbital Facility - A group of instruments designed to investigate vari-
ous paramleters of a conmlon subject or discipline.
0ualification - Determination that an article or material is capable
of meeting all design and performance requirements established for the
item. An item can be qualified by test, by analysis, or by similarity
to a qualified item.
Single Failure Point - A single item of hardware having all independent fail-
ure mode which would result in the functional loss of a system. Examples
are nonredundant valves, regulators, pumps, motors, switches, relays,
transistors, resistors, diodes, or a single path of passive electrical
hardware (e.g., wiring, solder joint, connectors, etc.) that could open or
short circuit.
Waiver - A _ritten authorization to accept an end item or other designated
item _hich, during ma1_ufacture or after having been submitted for inspec-
tion, is found to depart from specified requirements but is considered
suitable for use "as is' or after rework by an approved method.
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SECTIONI. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
This document is intended to familiarize prospective partici-
pants in future mannedspace programs with the methods and techniques
for experiment development and integration that evolved during the
Skylab Program. Future programs may not adopt identical procedures,
but insight into the Skylab experience, including the lessons learned,
will be of value as a reference for scientific investigators, experi-
ment developers, and integrators who face similar tasks in the future.
B. Scope
The Experimenter's Reference outlines the full spectrum of
experiment-related responsibilities, activities and events as they
were planned and executed in the Skylab Program. The planning and
the-execution sometimes varied; exceptions and variations were common
as the program developed. This is not a history of such deviations,
but rather a compilation of those methods and techniques which experi-
ence proved to be most effective for Skylab.
The major activities and events that involve experiments, and
their interrelationships, are illustrated in functional flow charts
for the overall program and for each of its major phases. An over-
view is given of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) management roles and responsibilities. The alternative
approaches of providing single experiments for individual investiga-
tors, versus a multi-instrument orbital facility with many "users,"
are discussed. The evolution of the experiment and its hardware,
and their integration with Skylab, are traced from initial concept
through delivery, integration testing, mission operations, data analy-
sis and reports. Configuration control and the influence of special
disciplines (safety, reliability, maintainability, quality assurancv
etc.) are separately treated. Public relations aspects are also
discussed. Skylab lessons learned are incorporated in tile form of
specific "Recommendations", interspersed at appropriate points througl_-
out the text. (Additional lessons learned across all program discip-
lines, as compiled by NASA lleadquarters and the various NASA centers,
may be found in References 1 through 4.)
Ti_e main text i_ intentionally concise. Additional details,
where considered appropriatL,, ar_ provided in :_,paratu app_Jldi_,s.
For example, n_aior c:_perin_,nt-rclated docum_nts r_,ferrL_d to throu:._h-
out the text are describ_,d in detail in App_,ndi:: A.
:I
C. Pro_ram G_,ncraL Flow
The gvncral fu_ctional flow of activities and _'wnts that
[nvoiwd an c×pcrimcnt followed a £airlv standardiz_.d pattern
(figure i), wh_,Lhcr for a1_ individual cxpcrime_L or for an instrument
[orming part of a facilit\. Distinct program phases, as identified
in figure i, arc amplified in SeCLions llI throu:al_ VIII; activities
which extended through many phases of the program are discussed
separately in sections II and IX through El and in Appendix B. A
second-level flow for each major program phase is included at the
beginning of the applicable section to illustrate the relationships
of activities discussed within that section. A "waterfall" chart of
experiment program elements (figure 2) depicts the overall Skylab
experiment program in greater detail.
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SECTION II. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
In general, management systems and techniques employed by NASA for
the Skylab Vrogram were outgrowths from those developed on previous man-
ned space programs. They naturally evolved and changed during Skylab;
further variations can be anticipated to accommodate the unique require-
ments of future programs. In reco_ition of this fact s an effort has
been made to identify the necessary management functlons in a general
way, regardless of who may be assigned to carry them c,at.
The areas of g_al responsibility for a space experiment pro-
gram are: I) program direction, 2) hardware development, 3) integration,
4) launch operations, 5) mission operations, and 6) analysis and report-
ing. For Skylab, NASA Headquarters retained the program direction respon-
sibility, and delegated the other roles to indivldual NASA centers.
RECOMMENDATION: At the outset of a program, publish and
• enforce clearly defined intercenter and intracenter author-
ities and responsibilities for all program elements.
A. Program Direction
NASA Headquarters provided the initial plannin_ and the top-level
direction for all program aspects. A Headquarters Program Office (the
Skylab Program Director and a limited staff) exercised this management
role by means of guidelines and directives to the NASA Center Program
Managers, and overall control of funds and schedules. Major decisions
involving program and mission objectives, experiment selections and
flight assignments, funding, and milestone schedules were made by Head-
quarters, with due consideration for inputs from the appropriate centers.
Various offices at Headquarters served as Sponsoring Program Offices
(SPO) for individual Skylab experiments (see Section III B). A Manned
Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), composed of representatives of
various NASA and Department of Defense organizations, performed a con-
tinuing advisory function for the Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, relative to major experiment decisions. (MSFEB covered not
only Skylab, but all current and contemplated manned space flight exper-
iment programs.)
B. Hardware Development Centers
Each major group of associated hardware end items (e.g., an ex-
periment or module) was assigned to an appropriate NASA center for
_,_r _ on the
• ,t_LL V _.' .",. 4- _ L 4., I t _Jeveaop1_ _ L. bc selected, depending
nature of the etld items and center capabilities.
i. Expcrimept Development Center. The Experiment Development
Center (EDC) was responsible for management o!- the design, development,
testillg, fabrication, qualification and delivery of the basic instrument,
supporting hardware and experiment-peculiar ground support equipment (GSE).
FolLowing delivery, the EDC monitored experiment performance and provided
technical consultation to the module development and operational centers
;hroughout postacceptance testing and mission operations. In many cases
the EDC utilized a development contractor to augment its capabilities.
The organization (government or contractor) that actually produced the
experiment hardware was referred to as the Experiment Developer (ED).
EDCs for Skylab experiments included: George C. Marshall Space Fl_ght
Center (MSFC), Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), Ames Research
Center (ARC), and Langley Research Center (LaRC). Other govermment
agencies, including the Department of Transportation, the United States
Air Force, and the Naval Research Laboratory, performed the EDC functions
for certain experiments. Specific NASA centers were assigned to work
with these organizations, acting as "proxy" EDCs to eliminate any
potential difficulties due to management and reporting technique varia-
tions utilized by different government agencies.
2. Module Development Center. The Module Development Center
had the same responsibilities relative to the module that the EDC had
for the experiment. In addition, the module development tenter managed
the installation and integration testing of the experiment hardware prior
to module delivery. The actual hardware, was developed by contractors
under the direction of the center project offices. JSC was the Command
and Service Module development center and MSFC was the development center
for the other Skylab modules.
C. Integration Center
This center was responsible for overall Skylab systems engineer-
ing and integration, which included managing experiment interfaces with
the total program. The Integration Center maintained a continuing com-
patibility assessment to assure that all experiments under its cognizance
were designed, fabricated, tested and operated in complete compatibility
with all program and experiment requirements; it also participated in the
resolution of interface problems that arose. MSFC was the Integration
Center for Skylab and utilized the supporting services of a Systems Engi-
neering and Integration Contractor.
In general, experiment integration responsibility was assigned to
the center developing the module that would carry the experiment, lTnus
MSFC was also the Experiment Integration Center (FIC) for all Skylab
flight experiments except those in the JSC-developed Command and Service
Module, or ct-_, procedural _.xp_.rimL'nts involving,, no sp_.ciai l'ardwar_.
i
i
lD. Launci_ Op,_rat_ons C,._tt.r
This center received the intcgratL'd modules and launch wqlich:
stages and performed final assembly, test and closeout to ensure that
the integrated system was ready for launch. The miniature requirements
for the final integrated systems test were provided by the Integration
Center to the Launch Operations Center. Launch was controlled from this
center through countdown and liftoff. Following liftoff, control of the
mission shifted to the Mission Operations Center. The John F. Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) was the Launch Operations Center for Skylab.
E, Mission Operations Center
This center was responsible foc controlling the mission to
ensure that mission objectives were satisfied. Prior to launch, this
center provided crew training and prepared flight planning and mission
operations documentation. After launch it controlled the mission by
monitoring all systems and updating preplanned crew activities as
required. This center was also responsible for recovery ol,erations
and data dissemination (see Sections VII and VIII). The Skylab Mission
Operations Center was JSC.
F. Cost and Schedule Control
Cost and schedule considerations were an important factor in
selecting the experiments and continuing them in the program. Intense
management scrutiny was brought to bear on those experiments that had
repeated overruns of estimated costs or delays in meeting established
milestones, which in turn added cost.
The NASA Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), through the
Skylab Program Office at Headquarters, exercised overall control of
Skylab budgets, costs and mileston_ event schedules. A Program
Operating Plan (POP), compiled and maintained at Headquarters,
reflected experiment resources commitments as originally approved in
the Experiment Implementation Plan and subsequently revised by approval
of inputs submitted by the cognizant centers. The POP was che authori-
tative summary of program funding and schedules.
RECOMMENDATION: Prior to approval of an experiment for
development, iilsist upon sufficient definition to pro-
vide realistic estimates of cost ceilings. For this
purpose, fillal approval might be withheld until after
Preliminary Des_i_n Review; or funding could be reviewed
and approvud in incrcm_u_Lal stag_s.
SECTIONIII. EXPERIMENTDEFINITION
i
Experiments proposed for the Skylab Program varied from new in-
vestigations to reflight of experiments f_ n other programs. Some,
developed during previous programs, had f ght hardware already avail-
able, while others were only concepts and _heir hardware designs had not
yet begun. The selection process, (see figure 3) was designed to en-
sure that experiments approved for Skylab had been thoroughly evaluated
on the basis of scientific merit and compatibility with the program's
objectives, capabilities, schedules and funding. The _rrent (post-
Skylab) NASA selection process is described in detail in Reference 5,
and reflects the Skylah experience.
A. Conceptual Approaches
Skylab experiment concepts were generated and implemented by
either of two approaches. _ere an individual scientist conceived an
acceptable investigation of a specific scientific objective, a single
experiment was generally developed to satisfy that objective, and the
originating scientist was identified as the Principal Investigator (PI).
Most of the experiments were generated in this way. The other approach
(which gained increasing favor during the Skylab Program) was that of
implementing an "Orbital Experiment Facility", comprising a group of
associated instruments dedicated to general investigations of a parti-
cular scientific discipline, such as earth resources or materials pro-
cessing in space. Facility instruments were generally conceived by a
small group or committee of scientists versed in the needs of the dis-
cipline involved. _en the facility concept or preliminary design had
progressed to the point where its capabilities were reasonably well
defined, an Announcement of Flight Opportunity (AFO) was issued to
potential "users" throughout the world. Interested scientists responded
with proposals for using the facility to gather data for their specific
investigations. Accepted proposals were contractually implemented with
the users by the EDC. A NASA Project Scientist at the EDC performed the
P1 functions (and represented the users) for each facility instrument.
The chief advantages of the facility approach are: much broader usage
of the instruments and data, and the fact that all the user scientists
need not be directly involved during the full program duration.
B. Sponsoring Program Office
Hach experiment required a Sponsoring Program Office to manage
the conceptual identification and feasibility phase of the experiment
A
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7definition. For Skvlab, the NASA sponsoring offic,:s wcrc tl_,' Office of
Manned Space Flight (OMSF), tlle Office of Space Science Applications
(OSSA), and the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART). The
Department of Defense (DOD) also scrw:d as sponsoring office for certain
experiments. The experiment's scientific discipline generally determint_d
the cognizant SPO.
Having received and concurred with the scientist's conceptual
proposal, the SPO formally presented it to the MSFEB for preliminary
consideration, and later for final approval. The SPO subsequently
monitored the scientific and technical integrit ,_ of approved experi-
ments through all program_lases to ensure that experiment objectives
were satisfied, and that _equate funding was provided.
C. Approval Cycle
Once an experiment was recommended by the I_FE_ for considera-
tion, an Experiment _aplementation Plan (EIP) was prepared and a com-
patibility assessment made.
i. E:[periment Implementation Plan. The PI and the designated
EDC jointly compiled experiment information in an EIP in as much detail
as possible. In addition to the experiment objectives, the EIP generally
included preliminary information for the design, fabrication, test and
delivery of experiment equipment, and the operating procedures necessary
to perform the experiment. An experiment development schedule and
_stimated funding (resources) requirements wcrc also included. Experi-
ment development and delivery schedules as r_q_ired in the EIP were
necessarily keyed to overall program-controlled mil_ston_s and module
l_v_l development and test schedules. Requirements identified in the
EIP were concurrently utilized by the Integration Center in performing
the compatibility assessment.
2. Compatibility Assessment. This study compared the experi-
ment's interface requirements with the program's existing capabilities
and constraints. Where incompatibilities were found, solutions or
alternate designs were proposed that would satisfy the experiment
objectives without unacceptable impact to the program. At this early
stage, the compatibility assessment was necessarily less detailed than
that described in Appendix B, but approached it as nearly as the pre-
liminary information would permit. Normally, the Integration Center
conducted this analysis, with support from the PI, the EDC, and the
operating centers as required.
3. Final Review and Approval. The experiment proposal,
supplemented b\ the EIP and compatibility ass_'ssmt.nt, was then rt,sub-
mittcd to the MSFEB for its rt,vit,w aild r_.corm1_l_dation, l'llt NASA
iO
1Associ_ttc Admtnistr.llor for Nanlwd Space F!i>'.i,.[(who also ch.lircd '.he
blSFEb) mad,.' tl_,-' ti_naL decision on approval oi Lhc ,.×pcrimcnt lot ira-
KECOHHENDATION: t'hnpllasi::_' t i_orou?.hncss in prcp,tration ol
the EIP and col_duct ok the compat ibifit_ assessment duri_n,,-',
tile initial expcrimctlL approval cycle, tot catty, id,:ntitt-
cation of all program impacts and any major problem areas.
D. Generation of Requirements
Upon final approval, two types of experiment requirements were
generated: the design requirements for the scientific instrument
development and the Intep cat ion requirements to support the experiment
during all phases of the program. The former were stated in a document
called the End Item Specif£cation (EIS) and the latter were identified
In an Experiment Requirements Document (ERD). Both of these documents
were the responsibility of the EIM2; however, the ERD required EIC and
operations center support and in some cases was actually prepared by
the EIC. [NOTE: Occasionally, in the early stages, the descriptive
portions of the ERD were used as a substitute for the preliminary EIS,
but this procedure x,,as generally concluded to bc less than satisfactor),_
RECOMMENDATION: Initiate preparation ol the EIS and ERD as
soon as possible after experiment approval. Since the I'RD
is an intc,,,ration ¢locttlnctll. primarit\ concerned x, itl_ pro-
_;l'/llll-wid__' illlcllact's, [t should bc plt,palcd and l/li|ill/aillv'd
b\ the I:IC, witi_ stlppol-I alld collCtlll-t,llcc |1°o111 lilt' l'il)_.
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proccedcd. A series el reviews was hc[d aml dcw'Lopmcnl and qtlalil i_cal-
lion tusts performed (see ti.,4urc 4), to _'nsure the satisfaction of design
and fntc,'facc requi,'cmcnts. The same sequence of rcv;cws and tests was
imposed on all cxperim_mts regardless of tlle hardware dcvclopm,._nt status
wllcn approved for Skviab. in general, new tests were waived only when
it could be denuanstrated LhaL previous teSLS had met or exceeded the
Sky lab requirements.
Detailed requirements and procedures for the various development
reviews are described in Appendix C. Appendix D presents a listing o£
specific considerations and constraints pertinent to experiment design.
An overview of the total experiment testing program is provided in
Appendix E.
A. Requirements Baseline
A tormai Prcifmi,mrv Requirements Review (PRR) was conducted by
the ElY. at the earliest pr.tctica[ date at. toY experiment approval and ED
sctcct ion. rlw purpose of the PRR was to vcrit\ all requirements that
had to be met to satisfy tnc cxperimept objccti"cs, as stated in the
prcl iminar\ EIS and ERD. l'hc PRR was intcl_dcd to csldblish its il rcqtiirc-
1":<'tit bas<'tinc: :l t,rclimill,ir\ EI.S wliict_ propelix spccilicd cxpcrim,'nt
requirement. _; in t_'I'IIIS O[ l_t'l'lOt'l_l/lllv't ' ctftcrid and limits; dn ERI) x,'tlich
pl-Opcll} sptcil i,'d ,'Xl,Cl-in',,':_.t i,.licl'l.lc, rcqtlirclut'i_ts op. t[lc lllodtl[c, Cl-,'x,_
|,tttl:i.'il , t ] i?;!tl ,llld l-t'covt, r\' opt'i'clt iOtlS ; t ill" Ittllllbi'l 7 Ol lTt'qtlilt'd t'lld
ilcl!iS ti.c., fii<<ilt, bdckttp, test ,Ilia tl',liili!l?_t tillits, llloclx-ups) and tiivir
.";c[lcdti[¢'s; and [[!c d<vcfol,l::cn' pl*O}kt.Illl pl.l'. 1.
IZECOH_'IENi)ATIOE: lilvol.\c op_t-aliolis pct'sonlIcl to ilclp
idcnt i I\, ass,,ss :l,l_d i-, solve t I,.,, impact s ol opt'rat ioi:a [
l+cquilcl!lcuts ut>ol! _.XpCl'imt'llt dcsivn (alld ViCe \'<LFSa)
/it the vat'iicst possib[t Sta);w ot dcx_'[opmcnt, to permit
tl+adcol Is lOl- tilt' c'[ ficicnt tlSw ol CI'CW t ilIW alia spil_.c'-
cratt capabi lit its durin,,, l.ilc mission° Consider ih,.
t_.asibi[il\ Ol nnattcndcd 0:" '.tl'Otllld-c'l, lil'l'CI].[t'd optratioli
lOr l't'pc'l, i [ iVt 0l" t illlc'-COllStllllill-_, I_tlll_. t ions that ,It, not
rcquil-c onboard ,rcu iu,.t,tmci_t. Hinimiz. <xpcrinkltt
impact s o_: collt'tll'17t'H[ Sp,lt't'Cl'aI I act i\'i t its.
B. l.xp, ri::'., .:t D< si!.n
ti:.pl<;:,, :la_i<v,: <,I :i'< !i1> r<qt;/i-,_:xt:ts 1;_',,_ i:;11",i\,,,I', dist..;:
',.,.is ,i,,o:::pli:,::< d i:" ',',,,_ p_:,t,q, s: :i;< d, .';{.i: ;tppi'o,1, i, ,lpp:o\, ,_ .tt
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the Fr,,liatimirv l)e._i_.'.n Itexic,w tPl)!<); and the detail design, appr._ved
at the Critical Dcsi.,-'.n Review (CDR)o
Devol,_pment _tctivities leading up t,-. tire, I'I)R _gere to: l) accom-
plish hardware prolimimirv design (subsystem blocl, dia<rams, ow,l:a[l_
di:ncnsi.ms, etc.), b_lsed up._n the technical requirclnents of the base-
lined EIS; 2) perform trade studies to evatuate alternate concept:s for
subsystems, consistent with the experiment PRR; 3) perform the develop-
ment activities tl_at verify new subsystem, manufacturing processes,
logic design, etc.; 4) de.lfine EIS rtequ£rements £or '_tie GSE; and 5) prepare
reliability, quality con tr_l, a:aintafnability and safety requirements
sections for _he experia_ent EIS.
RECOt_4ENDATION: Conduct necessary trade studies between
scientifically desirable and technically achievable
requirements (e.g., pointing tolerances) as ear|y as
possible in the development process, to avoid downstream
incompatibilities.
The PDR was tllen c_mducted by the EDC, where£n a design approach
was sel_,ctvd t_ pr,_ceed t t final design of flight hardware. The experi-
ment PDR _,bjectives were t._: 1) apprave the selected design approach
i,_r the flight hardware; 2) evaluate the justificatian ior the design
appr,ach sh,_wta (by trade studi(,s, technical reports, and/or development
tests); 3) approve the technical requirements for atock-ups and (;SF as
stat_,d in EI.Ss l_r these articles; 4_ review _;_e ad,:quacy <_f preliminary
Int, t-lac_. C,ntr_l 13,_cu:n,,nts ([CDs) pr,vided by tilt, ._l._dule llevcl,_plncnt
(',.ntt.r (.st,_. St.cti_n V); :;) appr_\,,, the verilicati_n plata l,_r the
sclcctc(t design; {_) appr>ve pr,_ducibility ._I the hardware; and 7) ,tppr>vc
tht, c,:npl,.tcd llight hardware, EIS with plan,< t ,r qttalitv, reliability,
salt,t\', and :ll_|itltdilldbi | itv.
l:.,ll_wir_g PDR, the wxpcri:nent design pr,cccded t,_ completion.
Vin.tl detdil,,d scht.matics and drm_,ings ._t :ill parts were bas,.d up,m the
I.IIS, [CDs, and the .tpprwed desig, n appr._ach frmn t.he PDR. Appendi× 13
lists a m,;nber .,_ spocilic c,nsiderati.ms that teore ree._gnized in the
d_.tail de.sign of Skyl.tb tliglat hardware anti GSE.
RI-;CO,._L_IENq)ATION:;: in additi,m t_, the detailed design c;m-
siderati ms rec,mmonded in Appendix D, the l,_llowing
g_,neral d,,si,e.n phi l_s_phv criteria are particularly
clnpha s i .,. cd :
._ C.arvtullv t, valudtc the c.,st-cltt.ctiv_.tll, ss ._1 usil_g
,'xi st ii17', ll,tl',,Iw,ll'i' | )1" Ili{'_,¢ }'ll',_l-,l{llS ,
i
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Build in safety features (e.g., interlocks, limit
switches, etc.) to protect the hardware and/or
enhance serviceability.
o Standardize crew interface hardware.
o Emphasize simplicity of operation as a primary design
objective (e.g., avoid multiple switching operations
that would permit selection of invalid modes or require
time delays to preclude logic race conditions).
o Design manned spaceflight hardware to facilitate
in-flight maintenance (e.g., provide accessibility
and suitable workstations with restraint aids for
crewmen, documents, small parts and tools).
o Provide telemetry or crew status indicators that give
direct readout of specific parameters needed for in-
flight assessment of experiment operation or for
troubleshooting hardware malfunctions.
o Ensure existence of capability for in-flight visual
observation of external experiments.
During this phase, the qualification and acceptance test
specifications were prepared, based upon limits in the EIS and pre-
liminary ICDs. A development (prototype) unit was usually fabricated
and used for development tests of new design, data system, unusual
manufacturing processes, etCo, and for crew training.
The design was then reviewed for compatibility with require-
ments at the experiment CDR° The CDR results were: baselining of
the approved detail design of the flight hardware, qualification unit,
and GSE for release to manufacturing; approval of qualification and
acceptance test specifications; approval of test and manufacturing
facilities; and a review of development test results to certify that
design and manufacturing would involve minimum risk.
RECOMMENDATION: Baselined experiment design should not b_
dependent on unproven advanced state-of-the-art features.
Resist product improvement type ci_anges after baselining,
unless they clearly enhance the probability of mission
success and/or improve cost-effcctivL_ness.
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IC. F, ll_ri,'_tti_n and Test
Using drdwin,v.s nppr.,vcd at Cl)t{, labricdti,m activities began.
lhe qu:uber _,l h.trdw.lrt, units lat_ric,)t,,d was a vilt-iabl,,, generally
depending up.,n the t'xp_'tJiu,.nt's colnph'xity, schedule and budget.
In add it i,m t,_ the prt.vi ,usly menti_nt,d development prototype and the
flight unit, there was normally a flight backup unit, a qualitication
test uriit and various training units, simulators and mock-ups. (in
s;_me cases, to minialize cost. it WaS iotlfld acceptable to reuse the
same hardware far more than one of these applicati_ms.) The qualifica-
tion unit. flight unit, and backup unit or spare parts were all built
and assembled to the same design drawings.
RECO_IEHDATION: Carefully evaluate the r_ed for multiple
hardware, trading off the apparent cost against the risk
of needing additional hard, are too late in the program
t, praduce it with,rot .?xcessive cost _,r delay.
At the earliest possible date. the qualification unit was fabri-
cated and subjected t.* qualillcation tests, to verify that the design
was c.,mpat ible with spccilied envir_rment.c, ldhenever tht. qualilication
ut_it lail,.d a test. c._rrcctivc action was taken. I1 this involved a
new dr,sign ,Jr ,| modilicdtiotl to th,. qualilicatiotl unit, it was necessary
th._t tht. new design .,r :n.,dilic.,ti.m b,, inc._rp._rated inta- th,, llight :lud
b ,cktip tinits.
The flight t,nlt was subj_.ctt,d t., .in .lcct.pt,inc'c test, usually at
l,,vcls l,,.ss scverv th,m thv qual,licdti.ul test bill ddequ.itt, t,_ verily
c 'tll.'l':lldllCt' t-_ in,, t|_,sit:ll l_qilllt, itlt,lttS ,._,| tl_r t.;tS.
Puring this pt_asv also, ti_. ED(2 and El) participated in meetings
with tht. [ntcvr.,ti.,n, H,,dule Development. itnd LatlllC[l /}perati,)ns Centers
t, t'st,thlish the test r,,quir,,a_cnts l-,_r po_qtacccptance integration test-
ing (<set. St, cti.m V.C}.
RI'ICt),%_II'IN1}A'I'IONS: Supplt,mt,uting the details in Apt, endix E,
tht, I,_1 I,_win,v, rye ,mmt,ndat i,ms apply to expcriment test ing
it1 gellt, rd 1.-
Pr.,vidt, t, xpt,ri;uent h,trdwdrt- dlld pt, t l.,r;u it,sting in
the l,,gical ,,rder (,i.e., haw' the development
unit avail.d, le edrlv in the pt,,._r,m_, and c.,mpl(,te
d,'vel,_pment ,_ml qual i I ic,lt i,m te,=tin_: pri,r to
!li_-!_t h,_rdw,tr_. ,t,-c,.i,t,in,,,).
].D
Emphasize early identification and timely baselining
of test and GSE requirements and responsibilities -
preferably as early as PDR. Minimize configuration
variations in CSE sets to be used for identical tests
at different test sites.
Utilize a teaal of test/experiment integration specialists
to develop appropriate integration test plans and
recpairements.
Place more reliance on experiment development, quali-
fication and acceptance test results to reduce
integrated testing.
Consider the cost-effectlveness of using interface
simulators to minimize interface verification tests
at the module level, and to preclude premature
experiment hardware delivery.
Support all experiment testing, both preacceptance
and postacceptance, with cognizant experiment
development and integration personnel for timely
problem identification and corrective actium.
T_. Acceptance and Delivery
Following fabrication and test, _ Configuration Inspection Re-
,,,_ew (CIR) was held to verify that the flight hardware to be accepted by
the EDC conformed to the approved design configuration. Qualification
and acceptance test results were assessed for validity and conformance
to requirements. The CIR also verified that the Acceptance Data Package
(ADP) was c_mplete and that problems which occurred after CDR had
been properly resolved. The ADP provided a complete set of descrip-
tive data f_r each deliverable end item, which was maintained current and
physically accompanied the hardware when shipped from site to site.
Appendix A includes a full description of the ADP contents. A DD250
(a NASA form for formal acceptance of the hardware), indicating any
shortages or open work items to be resolved prior to Flight Readiness
Review, was approved by the EDC at the c_mpletion of the CIR. Prior to
shipment from the p_int _f manufacture, a Certificate of Flight Worthi-
ness (CO_M) was prepared and endorsed by the _C representative (see
Appendix C).
RECO>LMENDATION: Define Ca standard list ot miui:_.lum
uccessarv ADP requir_ments, acct,ptab[e to all cc_.tt, rs
involved, and implement it contractually on all hard_,,are
developers.
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E. Lc_t_, Experiment Additi_ns
The wtlue ol the, Skvlab missions was c,)nsiderably enhanced by
app_-.wal, late in the pr,_gra_n, _f many new experiments (e.g., the
Fk, ltipttrpos, Elcctt-ic Furnace', t[>.' Sl. udv'tlL l.;'<pvrimctlts, and the Corot"
K_qlm, tek Observing Pr_gram). T_ develop these experiments without
impacting lat,nch dates required an expedited approach t:_ the methodoIogy
just described. One aspect of this approach was the use of a specialist
team t_ prepare major experiment development documentation. Integration
personnel, already familiar with the interfacing moduIe systems and with
Skylab documentation requirements, were assigned to assist the EDs J,-i
preparing such documents as the EIS; Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FlVlEA); Hazards Analyses; Operation, Maintenance and Handling (OM&tt)
procedures; Materials List; etc. The results were timely, c_nnplete,
c.,nststent and correctly formatted documents, prepared at minimal cost.
REC_EIfDATION: Expand upon the Skylab usage of specialist
teams for preparation of major expertment development docu-
mentatian, tc preclude each developer having to go through
his own learning cycle. Consider using similar teams for
experiment-related integration documentation as well.
SECI'[ONV. F,XPER[_,INFIN'rFGI_\T[ONWITtl 'I't{l._MODUIA:.
Developmentof the modul" that carried the experiments proceeded
in parallel with the experhnent development, as indicated in figure l.
"llle modules followed a similar pattern of design reviews, fabrication and
testing. In addition, however, experiment installation and integration
testing were performed prior to final mod,!e acceptance and delivery to
the launch site (see figure 5).
A. Module Requirements Baseline
A PRR was conducted by the Module Development Center to baseline
the technical requirements for the module. The mission and total orbital
assembly (cluster) requirements were reviewed (e.g., mission orbital
parameters and durations, module descriptions and interface requirements,
experiment assignments to modules, control weight allocations, power
profiles, pointing requirements, natural and induced design environments,
etc.). _NOTI;: As the program progressed, the need was recognized for
a separate specification identifying these overall system requicements
imposed at the cluster level. An interccnter C.luster Requirements Speci-
fication (CRS) was accordingly [mp'_.,nented, and became, in of feet, the
top-level Ihad Item Specilication_ t-_xperiment requirements identified
in the l.]-',l)s, current compatibi I ity as:,cssment_ and integration plans and
schedules were also reviewed at i'EI<. 'l'hc:qe actix, it ies, together with
completion of rely I'I_R actim_ items, established the program requirements
baseline for the module.
RIXIOblM1-;NI):VI'ION: I'.arlv in any new program (preferably prior
to module and expeYi:nent l'!<R.q) e._tabIish and basel int' the
equivalent of the Skylab Clust,,r b_cquire'ncnt:; Specification
and impose it upon a l l program elements, to ensure program-
wide compatil_ility with overall requirements (e.g., opera-
tional environments). At module Pt_R. formalize the nlodule
require,nents baseline in a pre|iminary ,nodule !:IS.
t_. Module Design and integration
'llle module design and integration proceeded in parallel with
the experiment dew'lopment activities (see Section IV). Module develop-
::it, lit activities included: 1_ the ba_;ic a11alw;i_: and design to meet
tnodul¢, requirel;_ent::; 23 d(,veloping pvclininarv t,×peri_:_ent ICl)s lot ust,
in the experi,:lent:;' t inal dr, sign, includinF_ d,,lillit ion of tin, ,,_odule
technical input:; (e.g., dvna:aic alld _;tatic load:;, number and t:ype oi
i
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electrical connectors, power level, voltages, etc.); 3 a continuing
compatibility assessment tc show st,ltus of design conformance to re-
quirements and to provide management visibility of problems; 4) pro-
viding overall module system block diagrams; 5) defining GSE require-
ments; and 6) establishing subsystem add-ons (batteries, propellant,
etc.) to satisfy mission requirements.
A module PDR was held to baseline the preliminary module design
and the integration approach. The preliminary EIS and block diagrams,
drawings, matrices, etc., "f each subsystem were reviewed to show con-
formance to technical requirements of the CRS. The technical adequacy
of the module design, ICDs, module FMEA, GSE requirements, an updated
integration plan, schedules and compatibility assessments were also
reviewed.
Final module detail design and integratlonwas then started,
utillzln o the PDR baseline. This involved: I) preparing engineering
drawings of all parts and assemblies, detail schematics, wiring dia-
grams, etc.; 2) building of a high-fidelity mock-up of the integrated
system for review at the CDR; 3) the detail design of all module-provided
GSE; 4) preparation of manufacturing and assembly plans and drawings;
5) preparation of qualification and acceptance test specifications;
6) completion of the module development program (cable layouts, struc-
tural vibration, etc.) to support final design; and 7) fabrication of
mechanical interface GSE (provided to some experiment developers prior
to delivery of flight experiments for verification of interfaces dur-
ing their acceptance testing).
The modul= CDR ecc,,rred after the majority of the experiment CDRs.
Review items included: i) analyses that suppoLted the _ign: 2) de-
tail drawings and plans; 3) the module FMb5%; 4) module qualification
and acceptance test specifications; 5) mock-ups; and 6) ICDs. ]q_e
CDR baselined the final design configuration of the module.
C. Integration Test Requirements and Procedures
During the final phase of experiment development, the Module
Development Center contractor nmde preparations for receipt of the
experiments and for the assembly and testing of the module subassemblies.
In testing the module, experiment electrical simulators (built by ex-
periment developers) were sometimes used in place of actual hardware.
This provided confidence in the design and eliminated many problems
prior to flight unit delivery. Special Post-Acceptance Test Require-
ments and Specifications (PATP_q) meetings were held with each EDC/FD
and the Integration and Launch Op_rat ions Ccnt_,rs, to dt.\,_,lop expt'rimv_l
requirements and criteria inptits for thL' moduh'/expcrimcnt intc._ration
t_'sts and rclatt, d portions of thw intc},,ratcd svst,qns tests dt thv launch
site. ['hv, outptll ol these I:lv, c[ ill!_s was ;i coordillJtwd ]Cxpt, rilnwnt iilt_,<l-d-
tion rest Rcquirwmcnts and 5pwcifications tl';il'RS) docunk.tlt, prwpal ,1 b\ tilt
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[nt_,gration Center and concurred with by all other centers and co..tractors
involved. The \lodule Devclop,_ent Center then compiled these requirements
and limit,_ into a Test and (Theckout Requirements and Specifications Docu-
_nent (TCR_D) for the _nodule, from which the detailed experiment integra-
tion test procedures* were subsequently prepared by the center responsible
for conducting the tests.
RECOb_.fi*:NDATION: gaseline I:ITRS documents for the various
experiments and module TCRSDs (or equivalents) as early
as possible, and maintain at least the TCRSDs under Level
II change control, to ensure clear and complete definition
of integration test requirements for all program elements.
bL_intain uniformity of procedures for performing identical
tests at different test sites.
D. Physical Integration, Acceptance and Deli_ry
The module now entered the final acceptance phase prior to
delivery to the launch site. Upon receipt of each experiment at the
module site, it _as subjLctcd [o an unpower_d receiving and inspection
test for transportation damage and completeness of parts and documenta-
tion. The hardware was then installed in the module, using module
assembly drawings and the experiment OM&II. A powered functional inter-
face verification (FIV) test of the experiment with the module was per-
formed to verify that all electrical and mechanical interfaces conformed
to the specifications in the TCRSD. Following FIV tests for all exper-
iments, a simulated mission test was conducted for the integrated system.
Some flight cre_nnen generally participated in this system test as part
of their crew training.
RI_CO,_DW,NDA'rlON: J!ncourage participation in experiment/
module integration tests by all flight crewmen who may be
req,,_rod to operate the experiment during the mission(s).
Upon successful colnpletion of all testing, a moduic CII< _::_ held.
The integrated system test results were reviewed to verify that the
,nodule had met the established requirements. A module DD250 and COF_4
were executed by NASA, and the integrated module was then shipped to the
launch site. Any experiment or subsystem that was removed for separate
shipment needed interface reverification at the launch site when it was
reinstalled. Experiments that were returned to the developer for modi-
fication or final calibration prior to shipment to the launch site
required an additional endorsement on their DD250 and COFW by the EDC.
* If flight checklists (see _ection VII) were available from the 51ission
O0eration_ Center, these test procedures followed _'--_,_ checklists as
closely a_ possible.
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RECOMMENDATION: Discourage removal of experiments after
module integration and acceptance. _en this is unavoid-
able, emphasize critical configuration control and main-
tenance of appropriate records by all parties involved.
E. Continuing Compatibility Assessment
The evolution of the experiment concepts and module designs to
hardware was supported throughout by a continuing compatibility assess-
ment, conducted by the Integration Center. This assessment monitored
the experiment interfaces -,ith the program for compatibility, proposed
and coordinated solutions to experiment incompatibility problems, and
provided management visibility of the experiment integration status.
Further details of this activity are provided in Appendix B.
RECO_4ENDATION: Follow the Skylab practice of utilizing a
highly qualified, specialized experiment integration te_.
Assign responsibility for each experiment (or group of
related experiments, depending upon complexity) to an indi-
vidual engineer, to act as the single-point source for com-
piling and disseminating experiment requirements and other
integration information. Assign responsibility for com-
patibilitv of experiments with each carrier system or
program a _cipline to an individual systems engineer, to
facilitate experiment liaison with other project groups.
Conduct continuous compatibility assessment and frequent
reviews throughout the development and integration phases,
providing timely management visibility of problem status.
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SI,It:'I'It+pN VI. I)RI:,I,.\I+N(:II INTI-It;Ib\TIc)N +\NT) L.AL'NCI| C)I>I,IRATLONB
[)l'l+|.ltll1_.'ll _llld |,tll[ICil ,Ic't i\;i l it'S (St't' I i3'.ttl-t' (+) wvrt' cottductt.d
by tlh + l.+tttllcll ()per:it i_,.s Cc.|tcl, witll tilt, t',,),,+ii ;di!ct + _'I tilt + [tttt'_,t-dl.i,iti
C,vutci and the support ,,I tilt, I+t,vt,loptue,lt_ and ,"lissi,)n Opt,rations Center.+<.
The peak .let ivity at tilt, 1.1_lnch center t+bvi,+usly t+ccurr(.d alter the
|dtltlch v(,hiclt,s, m_+dttlt,.<; ;trial cxpt'iimt'[lts w(.re dcliver['tl, but there w/Is
sir.nilicant activity pri,,r t,) tills time to establish the te."t and
tacility reqttirt,mt+nts and test procedures. Tasks perlormed to identily
these requi.realents, as related tt) experiments, began when the experi-
ment was apprc, ved for the i_rc)gr,.+,m and conti.mled thrtmghout the develop-
ment and integration phases.
A, Launch Center Test Preparations
Prior to receiving the mc_lule hardware, postacceptance test
requirt,ments, speci fi.cattons and constraints for each exper iment were
revit,_ed and approved in a series of ft, rmal PATRS meetings, attended
hv representatives fr,m all centers (see Section V.C). l.'ollowi.ng
these m(,etings, the bl,)dult, l'}evelt+pment Center ct)mpiled the applicable
m<,dult./t, xperilllent test requirt'al('l'tts, speci ticat i_)ns, and criteria
ncc_,ss.lry |,)1- prelatmch check.nit ,ind l,lt,nch _)perati_)ns into the m_,dt, lt,
']'¢'st ar:d Check,nit R+,quirt,ments :lrl(I Speci I it.at i_)ns I)+)cunlent.
Similarly, tht, lute vrati ,. t:(,r_tcr preparcd ci '['CRSI+ I)r t:he c,mlbined
intcgr.itt,d sx'st-t,;lls tcst. t+si.,., tilt + :l,.I-t+t,d-tip,,+ 'ICI<SD, th(, launch ct,Dter
plt,t+_.ll-t.d tlt+t,+i 1_,(t t t,st pl,ll'lS ,tl]d pr,+c,,dllrt,s I,)r sat i.,_lying th(,s(,
t-cqt_ir,,a|t,tlts, subject t,, revi,'w I_v th(, lntt,_trati,)n md Deve[opraent (senior.;.
'l'h_ 1 it,nob Ccllt t,i ,lls _ b_,nt, l itt,d I r+nl p,irt icip.it i+n in th(, SysLt'tu,'-;/
Op(,l-.iti._ns C.,mpltibility +'+s,..;c:..;saltult !{(+vi(,w (st,t, S,,_+ti_,n \'1[. A.2).
l_. !G,c_.ivin),, ,lud Inspect i._n
t'p_,n :lrriv:ll ;it th(, 1.t,,uch c_.nter, all hardware (incIudi.ng
t;Si-'.} ui_dcrwvl_.t Receivin,_ and Inspt.ctiol_ (R&t). The hardware was
ex;lnlint'd visu/illv l,)r any dam;i,_e incllrred during shipment. "l'h+, AI)P
was examined tot c,',mplctetlcss el all doct|mentatitm and certilications
i'_,quired l,_r acceptance bv the lciunch ctqlter. An 3, available transp_rta-
ti._n envir,mment;ll inf_rmati,m, such as temperature pro)files, passive
acct, ler,)mt,ter d/tta, etc., was revi_,wed to assure that handling and
shipment constraints had not been vio[at,ud.
ExpeFiai,,nts that wcrc tr,lnsp,,rt(,d t_ tile launcll center
into,_,,r;it(,d within th(, m,_dule passed thr,_ugh Receiving and Inspection
_,,iti) th_ :Ilk)dill(,. );xpt,l+imt.l,,'_s shil)p(,d s(,p,ir,ttt, lv It,m) the, al,)dule w(,r(,
l,,ct,i\ t,d ii-_dcp(,l_tlt<l_t Ix wi th th_,i r _wla ;\t'ccpt.llltt" D.it,l P,ick,iKes.
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Expcri',ncnts n._t installed _,n-module, _r actively inw_lved in tests,
were placed in an envirJqm, ntally controlled bonded storage area until
r<,quired fJr rise. All GSE tmderwent a checkout to ensure that
it iuncti,,ncd properly before being mated to flight hardware.
C. Prelaunch Integration Tests
Following R&l, testing at the launch center emphasized system-
to-system interface verification. Individual experiment testing was
minimized and consisted mainly of necessary reverification of interfaces
and final calibrations.
The activities at the launch center included: l) the assembly
and integration of modules to the launch vehicle; 2) verification of
all instrumentation, communication, environmental, electrical, mechani-
cal, and structural interfaces; 3) integrated systems tests which
exercised individual systems as well as combined systems to verify
overall space vehicle functional compatibility; 4) final Crew Compartment
Fit and Function (C2F 2) checks to assure flight crew members of proper
hardware integration, accessibility, and safety considerations; 5) final
calibration of experiment sens,_rs; 6) stowage of perishable items; and
7) securing of all hardware prior to launch.
D. Design Certification Review
:ks part ,_f a final assessment and cer[llication of the design
,,1 the t_tal mission c,_mplvx, the I)esign Certilicati,m Reviews (DCR) for
experiments and :u,_dules were h_,ld. All inv_lved centers participated
and the revi,.w was c,mducted bv the NASA tl_,adquarters Program Office.
DCR activities b_.,_an prior to flip:lit i_ardwarc shipment to the launch
center and ended during 1.aunch center ,_perations. The purpose of the
DCR wits t:_ examine the experimelK/m:_dule hardware design and the
desi,_n verific,_ti,m pr,,grams in ,_rder t,_ certify that the _wvrall
design had met the pr,_gram v_bjectives l:,r llight w_,rthiness and /light
safety.
The t,_ll_wing t,_pics were caver_*d at the I)CR: 1) an analysis
,_1 the purp,_se, design, and interface compatibility ,_f the exper£ments;
2) a summary _f actions taken as a rest_lt :_f previ,ms experiment
reviews; 3) a review ,_t sai_,tv and reliability cmasiderati,,ns included
in the hardware desigt_; 4) a review ,1 mission rules and contingency
plans; :)) an analysis ,_f all pri:_r hardware test programs; and b) the
status ,,f any remaining open acti,m ite:ns.
E. Flight Readiness Review
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) w;is held at the launch center
prior to launch, lq_is review assured program management that all asp,'cts
of the space vehicle, launch vehicle, launch compl,x, Mission Co_trol
Center (MCC), ground instrumentation and networks were ready for flight
opera tions.
The following topics were reviewed at the FRR: i) the status
of action items resulting from the DCR; 2) any hardware configuration
changes that had occurred since the DCR; 3) the current status of pre-
launch _ntegration testing at the launch center; 4) the status of major
anomaly reports; 5) a summary of all si_ificant problems that arose
during testlns, and their solutions; and 6) a sun.fry of waivers or
deviations that had been granted since the DCR.
F. Launch Operations
At the conclusion of the FRR, all testing and stowage was com-
pleted and attention focused upon final closeout of the entire flight
vehicle. The launch center was responsible for the launch countdown,
with the support of the Mission Operations Center. When the flight
vehicle cleared the launch complex (i.e., umbilical tower), full respon-
sibility for flight direction reverted to the Mission OperAtions Center
(except that the Air Force Range Safety Officer at the launch s_te
retained the option of intervening if range safety became endangered).
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SECTI.ON Vii. >I1SSION A,NT) RECOVI.:RY OPEI_kT[ONS
Once tile launch vehicle was in flight, the entire alission was
u_der the direct c,ntr_l ,_f th_ _ Missi_m Operations Center. The pro-
ccdures and techniques t_sed t_ perl_rm these tunctions had been under
development and rehearsal since the early phases of the program.
Figure 7 depicts the premission preparations and real-time functions
involved in conducting the mission and recovery operations.
A. Premission Preparations
Concurrently with hardware development and integrstionj
preparations were made for the operational phase of the mission.
This activity included the generation of mission and mission support
documents, reviews of applicable program documentation, crew training,
and the establishment and verification of operational readiness through
mission simulations.
I. Documentation Preparation. Using the ERD and module require-
ments, the Missions Operations Center prepared the basic mission docu-
ments.* The primary requirements documents were the Mission Requirements
D._cument (MRD) and tile Reference Flight Plan (RFP). The MRD defined
the requirements and c.mstraints for both the mission and the individual
experiments. The RFP c._r.¢erted tile bIRD informati_n into a detailed
timeline _,f crew acttvi._ics during the mission. These documents were
utili;;ed during the design and intcgrati,_n phases to shrew that adequate
tiille and S\'stetllS st,pp,_rt w,,t,ld b_, awlilablc t,_ perl,_rm the lllission.
Sh._rtlv bel,_rv liltlnch, thv _pdat_,d RFP becamc the actual Vlight Plan.
The, RFP did not c._ntain th(, detailed steps l,_r performing a ftmction,
hut was limitvd t,_ r_,Ierencin,_ the function (c.v,., 1,_ad film). The
,_lissi.,n (pcrati,,ns Ct, ntcr prepared Checklists I,_r each function (e.g.,
the detailed step._ for loading the film), based upon Volume II of the
OM&tt. The (,qlecklists and tIighc Plan were launched with the crew
uw,n th,,t,gh thcv t4,_ttld be tlpdated during th,, ;nissi_ Other ,_perati,mal
documcnt_s (c.,_:., Flight Hission Rules, Op<_rational I ._a Books, etc.) wcrc
prcparcd to provide iurtt_cr d,.:aiIs; these ill-i" d,'scribt-d in Appendix A.
RECObl_IVNI_ATION: Since Skylab premissi_,n estimates el crew
tim_, required t,_ pert,_rm work tasks in the ,_rbitaI environ-
ment were n;_t always pr_wen accurate in real time, utili.--te
Skylab missi,,n experi_.nce c,,rrelati,ms (n,,tably Experiment
M151, Time and M;,ti;,n Study) l:_r quantitative crew, task plan-
nin_ l-_r future _nissi,_ns.
:', Alt!:,t_gh 13,_t,_ R(.qtt, st V,_r:ns ll)!¢lsl Wcr,. als,, preparvd t,_ id,qatilv data
pr,ccssinrz rt,qt;ir,.:ncnts durin,e, th{ :lll,qsi.lll, th,. tiisctlssi,_n ,*1 the DRF
is it,. Sect i,n ',.11I, D,lt,l Pr,_c_.ssing, .\n._lx'sis and Rt.p_rtin_-.
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t2o Op+ratiot:s Compatibtfit\ Rc_i+x,s. i'o assur,. ,in tl'+te:.+:raL,d
::pproach to mission opcrat ions, a series el E×pcli:l_cnt Opcrat lens P[cln-
ninF, (I';OP) mcctin:.',s was convened dur[n 5 tl:_. dcvclopp,;_::l, and [p, tc_t-at[o::
phases. 'l'[lesc mcetinfs brou};hk together represent,It i\'cs oli t. xpcrimc;:t
dcvciopm_'nt and iutc:<cation, mission operations, li[2,ai:t pitlniiill,,4, PL/
users, and various mission support groups for the purpose ot assuriiL<
that compatibility existed between experiment objectives and experiment
operations Documentation pertaining to experiment operational require-
ments and techniques was rcvi_.wed and compared tot consistency with ex-
periment objectives. Potential operational conflicts between experimLnts
were resolved.
A more formal program-wide review, the Systems/Operations
Compatibility Assessment Review (SOCAR) was conducted prior to DCR.
It consisted of a series of preliminary meetings, similar to EOPs, but
involving design/developmen_ and integration personnel for all Skylab
systems, interfacing with the operational personnel at both launch and
mission operations sites. It culminated in a formal presentation, by
system, to senior program management. The SOCAR was generally con-
sidered quite effective in enhancing the program's operational rcadi-
ll_2S S .
RECOF_tENDATION: Incorporate the _quivalunt o[ the Skvlab
SOCAR in the fiormai program milestone rcvi,_,_s, to bc con-
ducted at ill,.' appropriatt_ time to assurw maximum coordina-
tion dnd subsequent readiness el tiw opcrat[onal planning:.
3. Cr_,w l'rainfln_;o Maximum _ti ici_'acv durinv on-orbit op, ra-
tiOllS is attail:cd whu:l the flight crww is thorotl:.'jll\ f:tll_il_dr \villi ti:,
hdrdvarc and the ._cncra[ objcctix'cs. To tliis c:_,t, t}_. Sk\'lab I [i,:ht
crews ulldcl-wctlt c.'<tcnsivc trainLnv, first _iti_ i_i:,:h-fidelit\ mock-ups
of the experiments and modt, lcs provided b\ the tutrdx,,are dcw'lopcrs.
Later, durin_ integration tests /It the l:'.,odu[e dw\,t, lopmwnt centers
{Section V) and at the [aunct_ center (St'orion V[), cle_L-n _,,,-i.. uswd
in place of technicians for operating the fli,qht i_ardwarc at every
opportunit\.. To simulate mission activitiws, the procvdu_rv, s [or tilosw
t_'sts involvin._ crew participation utilized the actual lligl_t ch¢ck-
1 ists whercw'r possible.
R_;COMMENDAT[ON: Follow up an>, problems or dcficien¢ivs
cncount,,'rcd dltF[ll}% crew training, to assurv proper reso-
lution and incorporation of any resulting hardware and/or
operational changes.
-+. Mission Sir:ulations. Prior to lauuc::, a s, ri,'s ol r:issio::
six:u_latious \gas p, rtormcd, to ,.xcrcis_ t},.v fli:.:ht ap, d s<pport p, rs,u::> l
in a r, aiisI ic n:issi_,,n ,::,,'iro:m:_::t. For t:,_ purpos_ ,,t tl:,.s, sLu:t._,I-
: ions, t::, :::issi,,:: :,as di\ :d,d i,:I,, dis' i:-,: pl:as,.s, ,.._:., lau::<::,
lirs'-da\ ac:ivi:i_s, activation, orhital o|,_ratio:ls, _t_. }.at}:
J {}
simulation was directed at a particular mission phase a_d covered a
period ranging from one 24-hour mission day, early in the simulation
program, to three consecutive 24-hour days as proficiency improved.
All activities directly involved in mission support _ocre exer-
cised, in an atmosphere designed to reproduce the actual mission environ-
ment insofar as possible, even to the extent of introducing hypoth,_ical
malfunctions and anomalies. Basic coordination, information flow and
operational procedures were established during these simulations. Fol-
lowing each simulation, a debriefing was conducted to discuss any opera-
tional problems uncovered, and corrective procedures were developed to
preclude their recurrence during the actual mission.
RECOI_4ENDATION: Conduct comprehensive prelaunch mission
simulations, utilizing all applicable com_nunications, data
links and support personnel.
B. Mission Control
Following launch, all phases of the mission were under the con-
trol of the MCC, located at tile Mission Operations Center. This in-
cluded planning for and operation of all module systems and maneuvers,
crew activities and experiment operations, from launch tilrough recovery.
Activities were planned in nea_-real time on a daily basis, and all
aspects of mission op._rations wcrc continuously monitor¢_d from the
ground.
The Flight Operations Director was r_sponsiblc for th_ mission
operations and provided the management interface b_t_cezl th_ Flight
Director and Program Management. "fh_. Flibk, Director, op_rati_g Irom
the MCC, had the direct r_sponsibilit> for mission _olltt'ol.
The general mission control Lunctions accomplisI_d b) 11ight
controllers, with tlle technical support of other centers and support
teams, were to monitor and evaluate, in real and near-real time, the
module systems, instrument systems, scientific data, flight plan activi-
ty, condition of the flight cr_w, and trajectory data. Based upozl these
data, decisions were made concerning the progress of the mission toward
satisfying mission objectives and the Detailed T_st Obj_ctiw.s from til_
MR/), and the need for procucding to alternate' flight plans. The. fli/J_t
crew was then advised of updated mission instructions al_d flight plans,
systems anomalies found during ground monitoring, ground uvaluations
and recommendat,.ons to solve or circumvent an\, anomalies.
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C. CrewOperations/Fli_ht Planning
The level of experiment accomFlishment is related to the efficiency
of the crew operations. A prime consideration during flight plan genera-
tion is the effective utilization of crew time. In any twenty-four-hour
period, a fixed percentage of time must be devoted to crew personal
activities such as sleep, meals, exercise, personal hygiene and rest
periods. The remaining time (approximately ten hours each day was avail-
able on Skylab) is devoted Lc experiment operation and, as required,
systems housekeeping.
Each day during the mission, a flight plan was generated by the
MCC to cover the following day's activities. This planp idemtical in
former ¢o the premission F1ig_t Plan, was distributed to all mission
support groups for review and comment and, after incorporation of approved
recommemdatlons, t_ final version was upliuked to the crew via tele-
printer before initiation of that day's activities. Specialized informa-
tion peculiar to that day's flight plan, such as critical times for target
acquisition_ precise exposure times or alterations to the on-board pro-
cedures checklists, were also uplinked as "preadvisory data" messages
(referred to as PADs). The PADs functioned as addenda to the informa-
tion stowed on-board in the Flight Data File (flight plan and checklists).
D. Mission Operational Support Teams
The functioning of the MCC during the missions was backed up by
an extensive support organization, both on-site at the Mission Operations
Center and remote at other NASA centers and contractor facilities. The
Huntsville Operations Support Center (llOSC) was the focal point of MSFC
support activities and fulfilled a major role in the conduct of the mission.
Support teams, organized by science/technical discipline or by spacecraft
system, were composed of representatives from the development and integra-
tion centers, contractors and Pls. They monitored the mission progress
in real time, and provided the MCC with in_ediately available expertise
r _ _tive to any experiment or system anomaly that arose. Eac]_ [_am i_i-
tiated and/or reviewed proposed mission changes to ensure satisfaction of
the requirements and constraints of their particular area of concern.
Their basic task was to assure the optimum success of their experiments
in the face of whatever off-nominal conditions might occur during the
mission. The primary areas of team concern were: I) continual planning of
future activity necessary to achieve maximum experiment success with relation
to all other mission parameters, and 2) rapid and accurate response to any
in-flight anomaly, either vehicle c experiment-related, to maximize the
experiment data returned under the prevailing conditions. In connection
with the flight planning activity, the Skylab experiment support teams
made regular inputs to the "Science Planning _leetings," conducted twice
!
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weekly by the Prod;ram Scicnt tst at the lqission Operations Center, which
proved to ['_c all ct[cctivc lllCallS [Ol7 in[itlt, llC[ll,.\ thc blCC tiigilt pl-anniiL_t.
RECOIqMENDATIONS: 'J.'hc primary rccommciidations rcst, lting
from Skvl.ab cxpc_'imcnt mission support exp..'ricncc were l
o Utilize personnel for mission support who have
participated in experiment development and/or
integration and have experience with hardware-
related problen_. Ready availability of the PIt
or their a_thor£zed representativei is highly
deslrable, partlcularly £or Lhe more complex
exper J._ncs.
0 ]_ovlAe n_ax-continuous commmtcat1_ _t_ Ipace-
craft and I_C, more direct c_catlon and data
}.inks between I_C and the miss£on support team,
and fewer intermediaries between the teams and the
flight crew during anomaly troubleshooting. Al$o_
limited but frequent direct cormnunications between
the flighc crew and the PIs are both feasible and
product ive.
Provide mission support teams with available experi-
ment hardware to permit realistic ground simulation,
t acilitat in.v, r,'at-t imc troubleshoot [rig.
Utili.zc trainer walk-throu!,,hs by _IrouiM-bascd
astt'ollatlts to check out lair' ,iddit ions arid real-
time procedural chan,,2,es beforv transmittil_g them
to the crew.
Emphasi:.:c act iw, part [cipation of experiment
tllissiotl support teams ill illlTItlL.'llC[ll,_?, preparation
ot daily tlight plans by maintaining liaison with
the MCC tlight planners and supporting semiweekly
science planning meetings.
E. Recovery Operations
Opt'ratiotls at tilt.' recovery site w_,rc platlned to ensure that
the integrity o[ physically returned experiment data (primarily
pl,otographic titre arm specimens) was not comprontiscd and that pre-
scribed handling and delivery requirements _,,or,, satisfied. These
rcquircmcnts, /llonv with an\" ,Ipplicabl,' Sul_pol't lunctious, had been
idoutiticd carl\' in the pl'o,v,l,un. Prclinlinar\ rccov,,r\' sitv rt'quirc-
mL'nts tot c_le[l cxpt'l'ilucllt x,,crc ith.ntiti_'d in th,' ori,<inal ERl)s, and
S|)c'v'il i_." [llttld_illb: [)I'oet_'dtll'CS wt, rc, J.ait, t" dclit_cd b\" me,Ills of I)RFs.
0
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These forms were used to detail temperature and humidity limits to be
observed, shielding requirements if applicable, special containers
required to protect the data, or other handling techniques necessary
to isolate the material from the external environment.
Following retrieval of the crew and spacecraft, recovery site
operations included deactivating potentially hazardous systems and
securing the module subsystems; initiation of ground support functions
such as purges, thermal conditioning, ground power, etc.; and the
retrievat of experiment and subsystems flight data. X_e returned data
were removed and packaged for transportation to the data distribution
center and subsequent processing _I/or disselination tot he Pis and
data users.
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SECTION VIII. DATA PROCESSING_ A_NALYSIS AND REPORTING
!
Data requirements of tile experiment Principal Investigator or
data user were initially stated in ERDs and subsequently amplified in
DP_Fs. Using these requirements, the Mission Operations Center developed
the plans and software required to retrieve, process and distribute all
flight data. The develoi_ment centers were responsible for the Mission
Evaluation Reports, and the Principal Investigator or data user was
responsible for scientific data analyses and reporting of results.
Figure 8 shows the functional flow for this phase.
RELATION: Clearly define the respective
responsibilities of NASA and the participating
scientists in the following areas:
o Funding
o Data retrieval, processing and delivery
o Systems performance data required
o Proprietary rights _ data
o Reporting requirements
o Data security, accoun,_ability and archiving
o Involvement in Public Affairs Office activities.
This was accomplished late in the Sk\lab Program by
implcm_ntation of the Experiment Scientific Data
Analysis and Reporting Documents (ESDARDs).
A. Premission Preparations
During the premission phase, arrangements were made for the
acquisition of data pertinent to experiment success. The initial
requirements wet,. stated in the ERDs. _he DRF was later L_mployed as
the formal method of requesting data for all users. The data required
for the scientific investigations was defined by the Pl/user, docu-
mented on Dl_'s, and submitted to a data requirements group at the
Mission Operations Center for approval, processing and implementation.
The DRFs specified the data recipient, the pertinent data required, the
specific times during the mission when the data was to be acquired,
desired format, and the date whoa the data was needed.
Based upon the DRFs, the Mission Operations Center prepared
software programs tot gt'nwra[ processing of the flight data. Further
(more detailL.d) proccssin/,, t-_'quircd by certain cxpcrimt, nts, was
provided b\. Lhc cognizant EDC, Avai/abh, proframs x,,,re _.x_.rcis_.d
during the mission simulations, using recorded data gcnvratcd durin_
the integration tt, sts.
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RECOM>[ENDATION: Skylab data processing and anal\sis
proved to b_' far more complex and time-consuming
(and therefore more costly) than anticipated, iudi-
eating the need for more emphasis on premission
rehearsals of the entire sequence, in order to op-
timize the operations, shorten data retrieval time,
and determine realistic time and cost requirements
for these activities.
B. Flight Data Processing
Flight data _ received and cacalosued at the _sio_ Opera-
tions Center both _uring and after the _tssion. geturned £1ight
samples _ere released to the PI for examination and m_x]Lys_s. Opera°
Ciorml fi]_ and much of the scientific film were proceed by the
ffJsaion Operations Center and rdUplicates diSc_edt_o l_l_e _t ......
users. In special cases, scientific fi_ T_ere delivered to the PIs
for processing and analysis, with the understanding t.hat_ the original
flight film and a reproducible master were to be returned to archives
at the completion of the analysis. Recorded and telemetry data were
processed through appropriate soitware programs and reduced to com-
puter-compatible tapes prior to release to the data users. Other
requested data formats included: tabular forms, strip charts, micro-
film, transcripts, video tapes and digital television displays.
C. Data Accountability
The PI was normally granted proprictar\ use of the returned
scientific data for a one-year period after all rt'questcd data was
delivered to him. Hc was responsible ior tile physical security and
integrity of all mission data received by him wllilc it was in his
possession. He wa_ required to take propur action to pruvcnt loss,
theft or unauthorized use o[ this matt_rial (refer to MSFC Management
Instruction 4010.2). At the conclusion of this period, all orbital
material was required to be returned to the EDC archives, i_crcaftur,
NASA retained control of the returned material for possible further
scientific investigations.
D. Scientific Data Reporting
A PI was normally granted initial publication rights to
experiment data for a period of one year. Each PI was responsible
for generating periodic reports of his inw, stigatiw_ findings at
intervals of 30 days, 90 da\s, 6 months and I year after splashdo_m.
Normally, within tl_c l-_ar p_:riod, tht PI was to deliver a final
r, port of his cxpcrim_.nt results for publicat ion. _Ol't_: '1"1_ PI's
proprietary and pablication ri_._i_ts, indicated a}_o\'_., x, ill i,_ m_ wa\
pr_cludc gove.rlll]lt'll[ access to and use of data tot mission anaivsis,
troubleshooting:, or oth_'r o[[icial purpost.s_
i
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E. Mission Evaluation Reports
The cognizant NASA centers were required to prepare Systems
Mission Evaluation Reports within six months following mission comple-
tion. These reports (see References 6 and 7) contained performance
evaluations of emperiment and systems hardware for which the reporting
NASA center had development responsibility, and also assessed the
degree to which operational constraints and interface requirements had
been met during the mission. They did not attempt to evaluate the
scientific significance of experiment data.
_eE1C
tar finat technic_I reports were produced for _e Apollo Telescope
Houut experiments (Reference 9) _ for e_ch SkyLab _odule.
_..
SECTION IX. CONFIGURATION _h%aNAGE_[ENT
The configuration management system provided a control cycle
for systematic evaluation, coordination and approval or disapproval of
all proposed changes to baselined specifications, hard.'are or systems,
to ensure that all involwed organizations were working to common con-
figuration baselines. Early identification, timely baselinlng, and
accurate, up-to-date maintenance of the hard_aare configuration status
and related design and operational documentation are essential to
effective progra_ lanage_ent, if for no other reason than to minimize
changes. The application of refined configuration management methods
and controls contributed to the successful integration of $kylab.
RECOI@IENDATIONS: Configuration management can be
made more straightforward (and thus less costly) if the
following documentation ground rules are adhered to:
o Establish a clear-cut, nonredundant documentation
tree early in the program, and enforce it on all
program elc-ments.
o Definitive information should appear in only onv
document, and each document should be tailored
to suit its purpose, omitting nonpcrttncnt or
redundant in_ormat ion,
o Impose pro:_ram-widc standard formats for major
document types, such as EIS and ERD.
O Baselin-_ documt'nts prior to initiation of activi-
ties that require their guidance.
o Formally dclett_ docum_,nts (or sections thereof)
from the program as soon as their pu, posc has
been served.
A. Configuration Control Organization
The primary or!.',anizat ions responsible for the Skvlab configura-
tion COII[I'O[ S\'Sl_,'lll wcrw:
[. CouI i_t_ratioi_. (oiltro[ l/oards, l'ht CCPo \,as :i pt-ir!ar\, Itulv[ it,;,
ol tll_., s\.stcms c",,.:illcerin}: act ivit\ and inc l_,Icd rt.pr, st,llla[ i%.'<'s Ii-o11 _.
2
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Lil,' \'al'iouS proj,'ct., el[iceS alld technical s\stclns dtscipkii_cs as appvo-
prkatc. Control ot the mal_\ intcrr_.hucd doctuncnts Zscc Appcudix A') was
accompttsi_cd on a mull i [c\'c [ basis'-
l'hc Lcw:[ i CCB appt'ovcd chanf, cs to the basctiqcd ow, ra[£ pro-
,,.'.ram rcquit'cmc_ts, [nc[ud[n!: pro,<r_tm ob,icctives , cxpcrimci_t ctssi_;nmcz_ts,
m,tjor scllcdu]_c milestones, And bridget &[locations. Approval autl_oritv
rested with t,he NASA tteadquartcrs Program Director. The Level I COB
also acted to resolve any matters referred to it by the Level lI CCB.
The Level II CCB approved changes to baselined requiremeut or
configuration documentation which would impact two or more centers (or
two or more project offices within a single center). Approval authority
rested with the center-level Progr_ l_anagers. All affected projects
and centers evaluated proposed changes for impacts to their respective
areas of responsibility, prior to l_vel II CCB action. This ensured
that tl,e total impact of a proposed change was fuiJy understood, tech-
nically assessed, and compatible with established :equiremen_s, costs
and schedules. If a change affected primary miss.on objectives, experi-
ment assignments, authorized funding, or major program milestones, the
I_,vel II CCB could either disapprove the change or refer it to tile Level
I CCB for disposition.
rhe Level lli CCB approved chan,,_-es to baseline rcquirtmwnt or
co,_figuration documcn{at_on af[ccthq: a si,_gl,, project office- _ _,ithin
the jurisdiction of a singlt, center. Approval a,_horit\"restwd with
,ach Fro.icct Mana!:vr responsibly for d,'v,,lopmcnt o: a major modt:lc or
-;rotlp el wNpclTil]]cllt s°
The Lcvc_ iV boards, oltcil i_llor_'_,t[l\ at a {_avd_,:ar,. ,o_travtor's
fact[it\, contro[h.d discrvtionar\ ip, t,.rnal cildlh,.',_'S |1oi atlvctiq;: pal-lt-
meters controlled at hi,.:hcr h,vvls.
2. Change Inter;ration _(._,'ki!_L_ Group IClWG). [i_c t:U,,_; iucl_M,d
rcprcscutativws ot the -,artous tcci_nical s\stvms discipki_,s aud s\st,'ms
¢ngin_,ering and int,gration, and pcrtorn,.wd a scre,'ni.n,,, lun<t i,_ for ti_.
CCBs throughout the premission phase of th,, program. This .,_:roup provcd
[o be a primary too[ for cnsurin,_ that tl_c cart\ d_.si.,_n was %,vt_ coor-
dinated.
3. ('onfigurnti_on Chan_e_lntcGration. A configuratio_ manaFt.mt,nl
support group was established ill caCil ill%'o[vcd cv.ntv, r to raai_t,tin dll t:p-
to-date status of intcrfacin,v hardware a_d docum_ntatten and to process
requested changes. This ._:roup coordh_atcd all proposed ci_an,,:,vs to vii-
sure tidal, the interests o[ all interfacing organizations iiad b,_n con-
sid,'r_d. "l'i_is lunc{io_l was r_1,'rrcd {o as Ct_III i,'.:_ral iO_._ ,iI_I;I_ i:_[_-
)',F,ltio_:. it inc[vtdcd l'cccipl el propt_svd v _,ti'_-, s, ,oovdi :,it i_,:' _,i',:_
!all affected organizations to determine total impact of tile change
(including cost and schedule), submittal to th_ appropriate CCB for
action, and maintenance of overall configuration status.
B. Configuration Control Operation
Changes to documentation and to hardware prior to baselining
were controlled initially by the originator or the hardware developer.
Once baselined, full configuration change control was implemented.
The proper intercenter experiment change process is illustrated in
figure 9.
Necessary changes were identified in various ways: by con-
tinuing compatibility assessment of the related doctments, by the
respective hardware milestone revlews, during hard,re dewelopment.
testing and manufacture, or by the au/dltion or deletion of experiments
during the program. The changes were generally initiated either by
the hardware developer or by the Integration Center support groups.
If initiated by the hardware developer, an Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) was prepared to define the change and its impact to the hardware,
systems, specifications, interface documents, cost and schedule. The
preliminary ECP was submitted to CI-WG by the originator, and was re-
viewed for impact on program documentation by the compatibility analysis
support group, and technically coordinated with the affected Pls
and others as necessary. If incompatibilities were identified, an
Engineering Change Request (ECR) and supporting change documer_tation
were prepared. The ECR was an adaptation of the ECP for use primarily
with program documents and specifications. The ECP, ECR and supportinN
documents formed a total package which presented all the change impacts
for CCB eval_ation. The approval, approval with changes, or disapproval
by the CCB chairman was implemented b\, a Configuration Control Board
Directive (CCBD).
Changes were also initiated by the Integratio,1 Center (through
the support groups) when incompatibilities were id_nLified. In this
event, the ECR was prepared and submitted to the CIWG for subsequent
CCB action. The hardware developer received and analyzed the ECR for
impact and, if an impact was identified, prepared _n ECP to defin¢_ it.
The ECP and the ECR were then processed by the CCB, as above.
file CCBD resulted in the preparation of Change Orders or Supple-
mental Agreements for transmittal to the affected contractor(s) or Pro-
ject Offices, directing the incorporation of the chang_ into the docu-
ments and hardware. Document chances were incorpora, ed and distribut_d
by the documL, nt custodians.
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C. Complete Change Package
It is essential that any change proposal identify all the
hardware and docume1_tation (at the same or other levels) which may be
affected thereby. Accordingly, when a change was initiated from any
source, the Integration Center formally' conducted a change impact
assessment. This assessment identified impacts to all interfacing
hardware and documentation that might be affected. A checklist was
used to identify the areas to be investigated. The changes were
precoordinated with all affected organizations by the Integration
Center before the CCB meeting. Thus the Integration Center was able
to prepare a complete and coordinated change package for assessment
at the C(IB meeting. The Integration Center was uniquely qualified
to perform this function and, by so doing, assured completeness and
consistency of format and relieved other affected organizations of
the need to expend resources to perform this task. Use of this
technique greatly expedited CCB control of experiment-related changes
at MSFC during the later stages of the Skylab Program.
RECO}_[ENDATION: Utilize tile "Complete Change Package"
concept and precoordinate change packages with all
appropriate disciplines _rior to presentation to the
CCB. NOTE: Configuration control cannot wait for
each organization to finalize its document changes
before acting on a proposal, lqle CCB Directive
documenting a decision will specify any modi£ications
to the change proposal that are considered necessary
by the CCB. Document update pages implementing the
CCB direction can th_n be prepared and distributL'd
b\ the responsible organizations.
D. Configuration Control Milestones
Configuration control closel\ followed th_ harctware development
milestones. Following the PRR for cact_ expt:riment and module, titu re-
quirements documents were baselined and thus came under CCB control
for changes. After PDR the documents that defined thv approved design
approach were controlled by the CCB. Likewise, following CDR, the
approved detail design and test specifications came under CCB control.
When two or more development activities tool< place i,l parall,-i
(such as experiment and module development) thcrL wcrc three ke\ Lt'wl
II CCB functions that permitted these activities to proceed smootilly.
The first occurred following the development PRRs, _,hL_n the F.R.Ds wcr_
placed under Lcv,.l II control, cv_.p thot_::!: ti_,', had b_.c_ bascl, i_,.d
prcviot_sD at L,.v,.1 IiI. Tltis allowed assurances t_ bt_t!_ d,v,.[opcrs
t :,,at tl_, il" (tt si _:il approacI_ s x,cr, b.lS, d {_:; i i rp.: :-t.q::ir_.::'.,::_t s, i .,.. ,
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[i,,,lt cila_,,_'es [o i_[erlTa¢_ rcqtl[t'cmc_ks would bc mi_imizcd a_M z_cc_ss :, ,,
cilan,_'cs idcntilied to all concerned. The second ftttlction occur-red
dt_t-in:: the dcsi2gu period prior to PDR, when the iCDs pr_,pared b\ t[_c
n_odttic center had to bc coordinated witl/ tlle tiDC to ci:stlrc mutt:.ti
a<rcemc_tt on the interface details. These preliminar\ ICDs were then
basc[ined at PDR, at which time the\ came under Level II cmatrol.
k itil Level 11 ICDs, the developers could contilluc their dc[ail designs
_ith assurance of having firm interface agreements. Tht: third major
CCB function at Level II was controi of the TCRSDs, which allowed tile
Module Development and Launch Operations Centers to prepare their
detailed test procedures for testing the integrated systems.
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Requirements established by specification for safety, reli-
ability, maintainability and quality assurance affected all phases
of the program ard were necessary to assure mission success. Inter-
related with these requirements, specific attention was focused on
crew systems (i.e., man/systems integration, or "human engineering'_),
materials compatibility, contamination control, and various other
systems-orlented disciplines. The impacts of these special disci-
plines upon an individual experiment were influenced to some extent
by the criticality of that experiment's potential failures.
Experiments were categorized £n the EIS according to the
criticality (severity) of potential effects that could be produced
by their worst-case failure modes. Criticality category identifica-
tions varied between centers, but were generally consistent with the
following basic definitions:
Category i (or I) - Adversely affects p_rsonnel safety
(flight or ground).
Category 2 (or II) - Causes loss of a primary missioi_
objective but does not adversely af£ ct personn_'l
safety (includes tmsch_d_lled termination of launch or
mission).
Category 3 (or IlL,X) Flay cause loss o£ a secondary
mission objective but does not adw, rsclv aftwct pwr-
sonn_:l safe.t\' or prvcludw thv aci_icw, m_:nt ol a primar 3
mission object ivv..
Category, 4 (or IIIB) - None of the above; generally
applicabl,, to rv:lativLiy passiw cxpt_rim_nts with
very simple interfaces.
RECOMMENDATION: Standardize criticality caLl.gory
and sub-category desigllations to b, ust_d by all
program cl_ments.
Thu criticaJ.iLy category influenced th= scope o[ the" s t't\',
rcliabilit\, qualit._ assurance: and test pl'o/rams ,tt tll_ t:':pL1;imv:_t,
modulv am! ov,.ral/ pro_trltm l_vcks, ll/Cl-v:asL.d S_l£wt,. mar:ins,
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special design features, increased inspections during fabricati_,n
and ctssemblv, and special tests t._ ensure existence ot adquate mar-
gins are examples _,f considerations given t_ experiments that ilad
h_gh-risk failur( m,_des. Tile w:_rst-case classificati_n was applied
with,_ut regard t._ probability of occurrence.
A. Safety
To ensure that hazards were identified and resolved throughout
the program, the development centers required formal or informal im-
plementation of safety program requirements for each end item. This
program assured that methods were adequately implemented for identifi-
cation and either elimination or control of potential hardware hazards
that could result in injury to personnel or damage or loss of flight
or ground hardware. Hazard Analyses were performed to identify, aml
offer solutions for, hazards that couid result from failures, normal
or emergency equipment operations, environments, personnel errors,
or design chaiacteristics. A "System Safety Checklist" (Reference IO),
containing specific design criteria applicable to flight and ground
hardware, has been developed to assist new programs in the appli-
cation of safety-related experience.
B. Reliability
Integral to the design and development process was the evalua-
tion of hardware reliability through analysis, review and assessment.
A Reliability Plan was prepared for each end item, describing how the
reliability requirements were to be implemented and c_.trolled.
Hardware failure m._des were defined ia F>AEAs. Based on the results
of the FMEAs, a Critic. Ytems Lt it (CIL) was prepared, which included
a summary '._fsingle failure poJn.'.s and critical redundant (backup) com-
p_nen,:s in life- or mlssion-css,_qgial equipment. In addition, design
criteria were provided fo.'-"the reliability of each subsystem. Reliability
testing per se _as genera!l F not done; however, in certain very critical
cases, some lifetime testiqg was conducted. After the hardware was
fabrlcated, a system of providing informatio_ on unsatisfact,,ry condi-
ti ms or anomalies was ,.itilized to keep abreast of reliability goals.
C, Maintainability
The requirements for maintainability are closely associated
with reliability and safety requirements during all program phases,
witl, the :najor effort concentrated in the design phase. The princi-
pal elements of maintainability assurance are: I) provide design
parameters (e.g., mean-time-to-repair, fault detection and isolation,
limited lifetime items); 2) analysis of design; 3) design review
participati,m; 4) data ,_n maintainability; and 5) verification and
dcm,nstrati.m ._t the, maintainability.
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To the extent practicable, cxperinlents were ddsi_llcd for
accessibilitv, replaceabilitv and serviceability during ground opera-
tions. Skylab's original design philosophy specificallv minin_ized
in-fLight maint_'nancc as a design considcratioa. The rationalL, for
this decision was quite logical in the circumstances. Inadequate
data existed at that time on the astronauts' ability to perform com-
plex tasks in space, or on the crew time, workshop space and weight
budget that would be available. Thus extensive reliance upon in-
flight maintenance, rather than designing for high inherent relia-
bility, would have involved high risk. Actually, as the program
matured, some minimal in-flight maintenance provisions were found to
be essential, and were added. During the actual missionsj ho_ever,
in coping with unforeseen anomalies, the astronauts demonstrated
excellent capabilities in this respect, even with improvised tools
and in extravehicular activity (EVA).
RECOI_--DATION: Design future manned space hardware
to permit a much greater degree of in-flight mainte-
nance, including EVA. Provide appropriate on-board
spares, crew training and supporting documentation
for maintenance tasks.
D. Quality Assurance
A Quality Assurance Program was implemented to ensure that
all necessary actions were taken to provide confidence that the
experiment would perform satisfactorily during flight. The quality
prog*-"-n provided methods for d_tL'cting, documenting and analyzing
deficiencies, system incompatibilities, or trends that could have
led to any unsatisfactory quality of the experiment hardware.
At all sites (development, integration, launch, mission
operations), a general inethod was used for reporting ail anomalies
(failures and unsatisfactory conditions) relating to flight, test,
simulator or training hardware. The reports identified the anomaly,
where it had occurred, and the corrective action required. All
participants (quality, engineering, test, NASA, etc.) concurred in
the corrective action by signature. Within this formal method of
tracking anomalies and recording their solutions, quality assurance
personnel were responsible for verifying that the anomaly occurred
as stated and that corcectiw, action requirements were adhered to.
A Failure Analysis was performed, where necessary, to determii1e the
cause of the anomaly and identify adequate measures that could be
implemented to prevent its recurrence. A status was maintainc_d on
all open anomalies until they were satisfactorily resolved.
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[i. C.r_ x, ,_,,qtt L'q
Stl'O/l?, Clnp[_,Isis ii_ til_' d,'si!'p,, d,",c[opm_':_t ,ti',d ip._c,.'l',lt iot: ol
• 1, •b,,\ [;lb t'xp,'ti]mlltS ;llld l_k_dtil_ s w.l.q pl_.lct tt tlpo ,_. l_.ll_,,'s\.qIL'_s il}tc "tit ioH
,Iild [ItIlll;lll cll.v, ip.ccri_n_', to ,'usurc ct I i,'icnt ut i li.:,t_ io_ ot tixc !'_roulld
alld t[i,4ht crc\,'s I capabilities ill tile =tppliCdbLw CII\it'Ol/lllCutS. [_J;Ill, !
SvStcm desi,4n cri_tcria wcrt_ established l_or r_:ad_ dcccss.ibit.ity and
idcutificatfo,1, conveniclit arrangemcat, and ease of opccati_olt of ,.'x-
pcriments and cluster s\stems equipment. General ciust<,r habitabiiitv.
fixed and portable illttmination, cot_trols and displays, mobility aids
and restraints, stowage, and provisions for extravehicular activities
received particular attention.
High-fidelity mock-ups and/or training hardware were utilized
to conduct numerous formal reviews and informal walk-through_ by
astronauts_ PIs, and integration _personnct during tire devetotmaent
- _- , _ 2 _ -
and integration phases, abe C-F tests were conduc'_ed on tlight hard-
ware am a part o£ acceptance te_ts and pretaunch checkout. Walk-
throughs _._ere also t'xtensivcly ased during the missions to check out
tlew or revised operational procedures before transmitting them to the
[light crew. Extraordinary activities involving EVA (e.g., deployment
ot a dama_:ed solar pant, l) _vcre rehearsed in the MSFC Neutral Buoyancy
S hllu[/tt or.
Posttlight cva[u;tl ioll ot Skvlctb crc_, s_stcms !,.ird_,'arc _s doctt-
mcntvd [n lIctcrclw, ' It. .\,IditLonat. l_. Rc[crt'n,, [2 _,,ts prt.p,lrcd to
pr.-vidc IWX. dud tnOl_, c[cilr[\ dcl ilwd d<,si:.\n cri'.ci l.i. b,|scd ot_ Skv[ab
CXpc'l" i t't:,'_' , | or tt,_, , 'P, |tit HI', pI'O/,l-;tu!s, t'i.Npt'l imcl_t -l, l,ll cd [t's_4Oll,q
[,',,ru, d : :c il:.: [udcJ !.;_ ti_c rt.com:,xt,nd.,,, ions ol <,'_t ions iV, V and Vii,
,,_d ill :\ppcnd,:\ 1).
F. }1<tt<'t't.l[s PlO-',rAn_
Sl,_tab p,Jflcv lot ct,,, rolliH_ .1,tt,'ri.tls s,_,c_ io_t, l,,st and
cvaiuat ion l-Cqtii red _ Ix.it _ach D,'vc [optzlcpt Ccutcr Pro,it/tin Ot I i ,c prwpArc
.m huplclnclxt;tt ion plan and idclxt if\' all imlividu,tl matcrla[s specialist
[O St'l'Vt' ;tS lot;l[ p,,il_t tot tilt, eclat cl_s nl:lt_rid[S p17o_1%111/. [tltcrcclltCF
coord[n.tt ion \,/is :lccompi. is[lcd b\ a In/ttcl'ia[s intcrccntcr _,'orking -;rottp,
wbicl_ cxchan.,:,,d pcrt im'nt inlormdt loll, lest dilta and dt'viations, ;|lid
rccoilc[[t,J dittt'rcitct's bctwccn tlw t-cHtt, i-s. [{ardwarc developers wt'l't.
r,'qu;rcd to subnlit appt-op|i.ltc matt'rials ami p/iris lists, und,.r th,'ir
respect iw, R,,li:lbitit\ P[al_S.
Iimportant materials charact,'ristics asscss_'d _'ere toxicity, odor,
outgassing, offgassing, and flaking or powdcril_g tendencies of paints
and coatings. Material.q information and test data provided signifi-
cant inputs to the in-flight contamination control program.
These activities on $kylab resulted in the preparation and
release of a new O_F material evaluation criteria document,
NHB 8060.1. Although released too late for formal implementation on
Skylab, NI4B 8060.1 is understood to be a requirement for current OMSF
programs.
G. Contamination Control
Hardware cleanliness monitoring prior to launch is a quality
assurance function, _nply covered by specificationsand conventional
quality control methods imposed on Skylab. However, analysis and
control of the contamination that can occur in and around an orbiting
spacecraft emerged as an important new discipline that warranted
status approaching that of a major functional system. In-flight con-
tamination, internal or external to the spacecraft, presented pote-tial
problems for nearly all experiments and cluster systems, notably those
involving critical optics or other operational surfaces.
A Contamination Control Working Group, including
representation from b_FC, JSC, KSC, the Pls aild contractors, was
established at the Integration Center to conduct, coordinate and
manage these efforts. Potential contamination sources were identified
and quantitatively defined with the help of extensive materials testing.
Experiment and systen: sensitivities to contamination were determined.
Rigorous analyses, supplemented by comprehensive systems ground test-
ing, were conducted to develop mathematical models of the performance
of the sources and thereby predict in-flight contamination levels.
Reconm_endations were made for design and operational procedure
criteria and changes to minimize contamination effe::ts (e.g., proper
timelining of experiment exposure or operation in relation to various
sources such as reaction control sy';tem firings and overboard venting).
Instrumentation was flown, such as quartz-crystal microbalances to
monitor mass deposition rates and cloud brightness monitors for the
induced atmosphere around the spacecraft. Flight data from these
monitors and from certain experiments was used to validate and improve
the prediction models' accuracy. The major sources of in-flight con-
tamination, as predicted, were materials outga.-:sing and reaction
control system firings. The total Skylab experience clearly demon-
strated the necessity for, and th_ validit\ of, the's, m_.asur_s.
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t io_ c,_ntrol pr:_:-ra'_ i_< ,ix',![i,!_]_ in R_ t_,r('ncc ] t. Some _'>:periment-
t-, 1,it,d dt, si_gn c,_',;sidtl-ati,_._ !rt, [dentfified in Appcndflx D.
RICCO}DIEND,XTIONS: Impl, _ :_t rigorous and comprehensive
me'asurcs for in-_ii_i,t contamination control early in
any new program, particularly where optical experiments
are involved. Integrate the degradation effects of all
contributory systems into the program design criteria
on a level comparable to the major functional systems.
Investigate new techniques for in-flight cleaning of
accessible and remote optics.
H. Other Special Disciplines
Various other Skylab systems engineering activities £n£1uenced
experiment development and integracion.
I. Electromagnetic Compatibility. An intercenter/contractor
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Working Group monitored compliance
with the Skylab requirement that hardware be free of adverse electro-
magnetic interference (EMI) under operational conditions. EMC
compliance was established during the design phase and demonstrated
predominantly by component-level testing, where circuit analysis was
not considered adequate. A minimum of ENC testing was conducted at
the module level to confirm the lower-level results. The EMC Working
Group reviewed all pertinent designs, analyses, tests and waivers,
No major DII problems were encountered during the Skylab missions.
2. Corona Suppression. A management-supported, program-wide
effort to emphasize corona prevention was the key to success in this
area. Corona specialists conducted frequent reviews of designs and test
plans with their originators. This effort proved sufficient to minimize
the degree of testing required and the rework of test failures that
occurred, while maximizing the assurances gained. No serious loss
of data or system failure due to corona effects occurred during the
Skylab missions.
3. Sneak Circuit Analysis. A sneak circuit analysis was
performed on the integrated electrical systems to assure a low proba-
bility of undesired current paths. A computer was used to help
develop a simplified schematic of SkylaL circuits for evaluation.
This analysis verified electrical interfaces and provided valuable
source material for checking operational documentation and for
fnvestigating real-time operational anomalies and workarounds.
1he program was successful in identifying 44 sneak circuits, plus
a number of unnecessary components and documentation errors.
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SECTION XI. PUBLIC RELATIONS
Public awareness of program objectives, progress and benefits
is an important obligation for NASA, which must be shared by the
scientific investigator. Different approaches for public relations
were required for the various experiments, depending upon an experi-
ment's public appeal, the public's awareness of the Principal Investi-
gator, and their abil£ty to comprehend the science mad potential
appl£catio_s of the experiment.
A. NASA Public Affairs Office
Each NASA center maintair_ a lSublic Affalrs_Office (_), with
established contacts for releasing Face-orlented news to the media.
Standard public affairs releases, consisting of NASA photographs with
captions and prepared news stories, were released to the national news
services. These releases normally contained only general background
experiment information.
Press conferences which required the Pl's participation were
arranged periodically. They were generally scheduled for periods of
peak public interest in the experiments (e.g., immediately prior to
launch, following experiment performance or return of flight data,
or to present results of flight data analysis). These briefings
were held where the space-oriented press was gathered; at the launch
center for launch, and at the operations center during mission opera-
tions. Often a press conference presentation led to a private inter
view with a newspaper, periodical, or news service reporter.
The press is primarily interested in results which can _asily
be understood by the public, i.e., the "biggest", the "best", or the
"first." It was extremely helpful when the PI played an active role
in releasing photographs of returned data with lucid explanations of
the observable scientific phenomena. Scientific analysis was not
required, or even desirable, in these press releases; simply a state-
ment of what occurred and its potential significance. The objective
of press briefings and press releases is to achieve public awareness,
rather than public education. An active interplay or established
liaison with the PA0 assured the PI that accurate experiment informa-
tion was being released, while the PAO was guaranteed interesting,
newsworthy releases.
RECOMMENDATION: Statements for publi_ r_l_asc should
not be issued without prior pro:_ram approval.
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B. Educational Programs
Various educational programs initiated by NASAmay require
participation by the PI and/or experiment development or integration
personnel. The following educational aids can be produced by NASA
with limited participation required from these personnel.
Film Clips - Ten-minute motion pictures can be filmed
of the PI explaining and demonstrating his experiment
and the application of its results. These films are
useful in providing p_r _m personnel with a more
experiments, or as pres-
_state-of-the-art of space
o
o Displays - Visitor center or museum-type displays can
be distributed to visually stimulate the public's
interest in space technology.
0 Postmission Historical Texts - Books printed after
mission completion, with extensive use of mission and
experiment photographs, can provide an informative,
nontechnical presentation of mission/experiment oper-
ations and results.
Many different types of documents and presentations may be
produced for educational purposes. These are the principal ones
which will require a degree of cooperation and information from
experiment personnel.
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DOE bXIENTAT ION
The principal experiment-related development, integration and
mission operations documents required and utilized on the Skylab pro-
gram are described in this Appendix. A documentation tree illustrating
their primary interrelationships is shown in figure A-I. All documents
were subordinate to the OMSF Skylab Program Specification, SE 140-001-1,
which was the top-level technical specification for major program func-
tional amd performance retirements.
A. Experiment Development Doct_mentatlon
_e approved Experiment Implementation Plan (EIP), as described
in Section lll.C.l, provided the initial experiment de[inition, from
_ich formal development documentation w_s derived.
An OMSF '_Experiment General Specification for Hardware Develop-
ment" (EGS) identified requirements to be selectively imposed upon ex-
periment developers, at the discretion of the Experiment Development
Center. Considerable flexibility was permitted in EGS implementation
(depending upon the experiment's complexity and criticality) to mini-
mize development costs within the constraints of crew safety and mis-
sion Success. As an EDC, JSC imposed its o_m "Experiment Hardware
General Requirements Document" (EIIGRD), which generally paralleled EGS
requirements but differed in some significant details. Specific devel-
opment documentation requirements identified in these two specifications
_crc similar, except as otherwise noted herein.
RECOMMENDATION: Establish and maintain uniformity
of r_quiremcnts among diverse cxpc_riment developers
by selective implcm_ntation of a sin_le coordinated
gm_eral requirements specification across all pro-
gram elements.
Development documents were categorized by thv cognizant EDC
as: Type I, to be submitted for approval; Type II, to be submitted
for review; or Type III, required to bc available upon request, but
not formally submitted. The Type I category was generally limited
to documents that defined and/or controlled major elements of program
cost, schedule, or pvrformancc.
L. blana&_,m_nt Plan. At th_ outset of th_ dvwiopm_nt <[fort,
a Managcm, nt Plan _,as prvpar_,d b\ tb.c lid for t'.'I)C approval, dcfinJn:,;
thv, mana_<,r,_,nt organization and procL, durLs to l_. us_.d during d,:vt, lop-
lmnt ol the v_xpvrirat.nt hardx,arv, and GSE. it dvfined tilt. rt-sponsibilitics
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and controls to be established and maintained throughout an integrated
development effort, covering all hardx, are and GSE for which the developer
was responsible. Tile plan contained the following sections:
o General Management - defining the management structure,
responsibilities and controls for the overall
development effort
o Quality Assurance - defining a Quality Program Plan
and a Contamination Control Plan
o Reliability Plan
o Configuration _nagement Plan
o Test _agement Plan
o _gistics Support Plan
o Manufacturing Plan
o Development Schedule- defining detailed schedules for
the design, manufacturing and test efforts, includ-
ing all related configuration manage_nt reviews,
documentation and hardware deliveries
o Nonmetallic Materials Plan (EHGRD only)
o System Safety Plan (EHGRD only)
2. Configuration Management Documents
a. End Item Specification. The ED was required to pre--
pare and maintain a detailed End Item Specification (EIS_ for each
type of experiment hardware identified in his Statement of Work (i.e.,
flight, mock-up and training hardware, and GSE). The EIS contained
the total requirements for thL. development program and formed the
technical basis for the contract between the ED and EDC. Specifica-
tions were prepared on a paragraph-by-paragraph d_viation basis to
the EGS or EHGRD. The flight hard_.,a_c EIS was prepared and approved
before starting any development _ffort; minimum inputs for its prepara-
tion _,er_. the experiment proposal, EIP, and compatibility assessment.
The flight hardwar_ EIS covered also the backup, qualification test,
and flight-type training hardware, _'hich were required to be identical
in configuration _,ith the flight article. The EISs for other hardware
were generally prepared on a deviation basis from the flight hardware
EIS.
The EIS outline, as prescribed by the EGS, is shown in Table
A-I. ENOTE: The JSC EIS, as per the EHGRD, was essentially identical
through the area of Performance and Design Requirements, but thereafter
included mor_ detail in the areas 0i Quality Assurance, Reliability,
Verification, Configuration Management and Documentation. JSC utilized
a separate Configuration SpLcificatiou as the control document for hard-
ware d_vclopm_nt, in lieu of ti_v Part II hiS.]
After initial approval, sp_,cification chal>,__:s could bc incor-
porated only ti_rot,,>:h CCB-approw:d Engineering Chart c Proposals (ECPs)
and Spvcification Change. Notic_,s (SCNs).
58
!TABLE A-i. END ITEM SPECIFICATION OUTLINE (PER EGS)
PART I. PERFORMANCE/DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
i. SCOPE (including Criticality Category)
i.i Changes
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
3. PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Performance
3.1.1 Functional (Overall System; Mechanical, Electrical/
Electronic and Other Subsystems)
3.1.2 Operability (Reliability, Maintainability, Useful Life,
Natural and Induced Envlror_ments, Transportability,
Human Engineering, Safe ty)
3.2 Interface Requirements
3.2.1 Flight llard_re (Flight Vehicle, Other Experiments,
Ground Comnunications, Flight Crew, Mission, CSE,
Faci IiCies)
3.2.2 Zero Gravit,, Type Training Hardware
3.2.3 Neutral Buoyancy Type Treining Hardware
3.2.4 Simulator Type Training kardware
3.2.5 ICD List
3.3 Design and Construction
3,3.1 Mechanical
3.3.2 Electrical and Electronic
3.3.3 Fluid (Gas and Liquid)
3.3.4 Debris Prot_,c tion
3.3.5 Cleanliness
3.3.6 Test Provisions
3.3.7 Singl_ Failure Points
3.3.8 Rcdundanc\,
3.3.9 Selection of Sp_ciiications and Standards
3.3.10 Materials, Parts and Processes
3.3.11 Standard Parts
3.3.12 Fungus Resistance
3.3.13 Corrosion Prevention
3.3.14 Intcrchangeabilitv and Replaccability
3.3.15 Workmanship
3.3.16 Electromagnetic Interference
3.3.17 Identification and Marking
3.3.18 StoragL
3.3.19 Pyrotechnic Devices
4. TEST/PRODUCT ASSURANCE REQUIREMJ'NTS
4.1 Verification Matrix
4.2 Test Types
4.2.1 D,:wlopvwnt
4.2.2 Qt,alifi_at ion
4.2.3 M liabilit ,,
,.2.4 Otilcr "FLsts (lntc:,,,ra_,.d S\sl_,ms, l:li ,i_I ',',rili_al i,,_:,
Post f lizht)
4.3 R,'.j,'c t ion
59
TABLE A-I. END ITEM SPECIFICATION OUTLINE (PER EGS) (Continued)
2.....
5. DATA LIST
6. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
7. NOTES
PART II. PRODUCT CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS
I. SCOPE
i.i Product Configuration Baseline Acceptance
1.2 Changes
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
3. PRODUCT REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Performance
3.1.1 Functional Characteristics
3.2 Configuration
3.2.1 Manufacturing Drawings
4. TEST/FRDIXJCT ACL"EFTARCE _S
4.1 Acceptance Matrix
4.2 Test Types
4.2.1 Acceptance
4.2.2 Other Tests (Integrated Systems, Prelaunch)
4.3 Rejection
5. DATA LIST
6. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
6.1 Preservation and Packaging
6.2 Packiug
6.3 Shipment
7. NOTES
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b. Engineering Drawings. The ED prepared engineering
drawings to control, by means of pictorial or llarrative presentations,
the physical and functional engineering requirements for each part oi
the hardware to be produced. The drawing tree progressed from the top
assembly drawlng to detail component and part drawings. They provided,
directly or by reference, all data needed for use in conjunction with
specifications, test procedures and reports, inspectlon procedures,
acceptance and rejection criteria, processes, mandals, operational pro-
cedures, safety precautions, surface cleanliness requirements, etc.
The engineering drawings included:
All essential drawing information needed to permit an
evaluation or a feasibility stray of the proposed design,
or to docvment the results of exploratory research or
development effort.
o Sufficientdetail to enabieevaluation and control of
physical and functional design interrelatioaships of
interdependent components, equipments, subsystems,
systems, ground support equipment or facilities.
o All drawing information necessary to support installa-
tion, operation, maintenance and interehangeability
during tests and operational use.
The necessary design, engineering, manufacturing and
quality support information, directly or by refe!-ence,
to enable the procurement, _ithout additional design
effort or recourse to the original design activity, of
an item that duplicated the physical and performance
characteristics of the original design.
c. Technical Reports. The results of studies and analy-
ses performed during the development effort were documented in tech-
nical reports. The reports covered load analyses, stress analys_s,
trade-off studies, etc., and were :_ot standardized in format.
d. Review Minutes. Minutes were prepared for each PRR,
PDR and CDR. The minutes for each review consisted of two parts.
Part A provided an immediate record of the review proceedings and
included all items requiring post-review actions. Part B was pre-
pared after the final disposition of all Part A action items, and
reported the final disposition of each. (See Appendix C.)
e. Configuration Inspection (Acceptance) Review Report t
A CIR Report was prepared for each acceptance revie_ (s_c Appendix C).
It provided a record of the review r_sults, including:
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Acki,)Jl i_t,mS wi[it LhLir dispositiol_
Waiwcs or d_viat[ions authorized
Shorta-;,.s aut l_orizcd
Cop> of the completed Form DD250 (Material, Inspection
and R_c_ivi,lg Report)
3o Quality Assuranc,. Documents
a. Acceptance Data Pa_ The ED prepared an Acceptance
Data Package (ADP) for each deliw, rable hardware end item. After deliv-
ery, the ADP stayed with the hard,_are and was updated to reflect subse-
quent usage. The hardware custodian was responsible for maintaining
the ADP current as required. The package included but was not neces-
sarily limited to the following:
o
o
0
0
0
Equipment logs (see item A.3.c)
Engineering drawings down to the replaceable component
level (see item A.2.b)
Inventory of serialized components, including part number,
name, serial number, and the associated experiment
hardware subsystem
Report of actual weight and center of gravity
Operating, Maintenance and Handling (OMNH) procedures
'sec item A.7)
Calibration Data Report (see item A.5.c)
Listil_g of all Material Review Records (see item A.3.b)
End item Specification, Paris I and II or Configuration
Specification (see it_'m A.2.a)
Cectification that the hardwar_ llad been cicaned in
accordance with th,' Contamination Control Plan (see
item A. 1)
Failure Reports and Failure Analysis and Corrective
Action Reports (see items A.3.d & c)
Configuration Inspection (Acccptaucc) Review Report
(see item A.2.c)
b. Material Review Records. A Material Review Board
(MRB) at the hardware development site was composed of ED design
engineering and quality representatives and the EDC's designated
quality representative. The MRB reviewed and determined disposition
of articles or materials submitted by ED quality assurance as "non-
conforming" with applicable drawings, specifications or other require-
ments Accurate Material Review., Records of MRB actions, including
assurance of effective remedial and preventive actions, were main-
rained and incorporated in the appropriatu hardware ADP.
c. Equipment LoGs. An Equipment Log _as prcpar,:d and
l?],lil]taJt],;J for _aCil najor ilardwarc compon,,at, st_bsxstt ln_, and s\ sl ,_-_
_2
to document tlle continuous history of the item. Entries included, but
were not limited to, the following: I) date of entry, 2) identity of
test or inspection, 3) environmental conditions, 4) characteristics
investigated, 5) parameter measurements, 6) identity of instrumentation
used and calibration dates, 7) record of all storage, operating, and
test times, and listing of time/cycle critical items, 8) cumulative
number of duty cycles, 9) discrepancies, i0) repair and maintenance
records, II) record of pertinent unusual or questionable occurrences,
12) action taken to formalize quick fixes, 13) identity of individual
making entry. The equipment logs, as part of the ADP, were available
at all times for inspection and review with the equipment.
d. Failure and Unsatisfactory Condition (UC) geports.
Failure and UC Reports were prepared by the developer for any failure
where a system, subsystem, component or part was unable to perform its
required function under the specified conditions for the specified
durati_. Each report contained the part nmaber, name of paxt, JerLsl
number, part manufacturer, date problem was first detected, test being
conducted when the problem occurred, conditions at time of problem,
problem description, problem cause (if known), and any other informa-
tion considered pertinent.
e. Failure Analysis and Corrective Action Reports.
Failure Analysis and Corrective Action Reports were prepared by tile
developer for each reported failure. Each report referenced the Failure
Report, defined the method of analysis, documented the results, defined
the action(s) necessary to prevent recurrence of the failure, and
included justification for the selected action. If the proposed cor-
rective action required a change to the baseline configuration, the
failure analysis and proposed corrective action were submitted with
an ECP. After approval of the change proposal, the approved Failure
Analysis and Corrective Action Report was submitted, indicating the
need for reverification and containing provisions for signature close-
out of the item.
4. Reliability Documents
a. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Reports. FMEA
reports were prepared for each end item to identify critical failure
areas and remove susceptibility to such failures. These analyses were
performed on each component of the end item and each potential failure
was cateBorized according to its probability of occurrence and conse-
quent effect on mission success (see Criticality Categories, Section
X). These reports served as an aid in proportioning the effort
required for corrective design action and reliability control. Each
report included a Single Failure Point Summary, a Hazards Summary and
Reliability Logic Block Diagrams. The single failur_ point summary
summarized all Category 1 and 2 single-point [ailurc modes by identi-
fying the: i) item name, 2) failure mod_, 3) vffcct of failL1r_ upoi_
!
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t!ic svst,.'m, 4) criticalit\ of tl_.' failure, 3) means of dot,eLlen,
o) required correct iv,' act [on, at_d 7) jusiil[icatiol_ or rat ionaic of
;wccptailcc if corrcckiw action was not impL_m_.llLc'd. 'flit liazards
Sunmlary identified slid categorized catastropllic or critical hazards
i_l cltvironmctlt, ilard_arc, test, training, operational procedures and
i,_tcrfacc co,_ditions alld discussed steps to rciicw' tlws_, hazards.
rhc Reliability Logic Block Diagrams showed tile functional iJltcr-
dcpendencies among the system components so that the effects of a
functional failure could be readily traced throt,gh tlw system. All
redundancies or other means for preventing failure effects wcrc shown
as functional blocks or notes.
b. Electrical.. E lec.trqnic_, and E!_ct.r_c_an_iTcal___Farts
List. z%_ EEE Parts List was prepared to identify all EkE parts in
use, and included as a minimum tllc following: I) generic part, type,
naaw and number_ 2) common designation, 3) laanufacturcr's name,
4) manufacturer's part number, 5) package type, 6) specification name
and number, 7) quantities used per replaceable assembly and iaentifi-
cation of replaceable assembly, 8) limited life part restrictions,
and 9) qualification methods and status.
c. Materials List. A Materials List was prepared, identi-
fying all nonmetallic materials in use, and also containing a summary
of metallic materials used that reflected any recognized flarrmability,
toxicit\ or odor hazards inherent in the design through rise of metal-
lic materials. The Materials List included as a minimum the following:
1) part number, 2) major asscmbIy" part ,mmber, 3) ;;cncric idcntifica-
/ion, 4) material manufacturer, 5) material spwcifications, O) tradc
name or commercial name and catalog number, 7) us/U.'._ category, _) '.,,_'i;4]_t
p¢l" tlSa:aC, 9) exposed s,rfacc ar_.a, and 10) method of w_rification and
.q[ a[ LIS.
5. Test Doct_men k s
a. VcrificaLio1_ Plan. A separate w.rification pla_ for
each end it_'m was prepared by the ED and submitted for approval at
the PDR. It defined the verification methods (similarity, analysis,
inspection, demonstration, validation of records, or test) to be used
to verify that the end item met each technical requirement in the EIS.
For requirements to be satisfied by assessment, the plan described the
specific types of analyses, inspections, etc, to be conducted (i.e.,
stress analxses, thermal analyses, radiographic inspections, ctc),
defined the objectives of these methods, and identified the documents
that would contain the assessment. When a requirement was to hu veri-
fied by test, the Verification Plan defined: specific tests to be
conduct ,.d ; cqtlip_'._cnt co.n_poncnts, parts, ctc, to bc tested; test objcc-
tiv,.s; locations where tests wcr, _ to bc condt_ct,,d; faciliti_.s and
_.qt:ipr.',cnt support requirements; a_d tim,: phasin!, of tl_ _ _<.sts. Tht
test pro_ran was to provide, only ti_c minimum ttsts n,:ccssarx, bascd
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on the criticality and complexity of the experiment. The entire
spectrum of tests WaS £1llalvzcd aS all integrattd effort to minimize
test requirements and prevent duplication. Testi_g was conducted at
the highest feasible level of hardware assembly. For w-ry simple
experiments, the test plan, specification and procedurw could be com-
bined into the same document.
b. Test Specifications. A Test Specification was pre-
pared by the ED for each type of test defined in the Verification Plan.
Each specification included, as applicable: test item nomenclature and
identification; test objectives; quantity to be tested; test parameters
or performance criteria, with limits or tolerances; acceptance and re-
jection criteria; environmental conditions; hazardous operati_s or
situations; reference to applicable safety standards, rules and regula-
tions; allowable adjustment or maintenance operations; requirements for
data recording, analysis, retest and reporting of test results; _nd
test &rticte di_itia_. - ............................
c. Test Procedures. Test Procedures were prepared by the
ED for each type of inspection and test defined in his test specifica-
tions. The Test Procedures prescribed steps to be accomplished in
detail and sequence, test equipment to be used, calibration require-
ments, layout and interconnection of equipment, safety practices (tot
equipment and personnel) to be observed and criteria for passing the
test, including tolerances. Development test procedures were not sub-
mitted for approval; however, all other (qualification, acceptance,
etc) procedures _ere submitted for EDC approval.
d. Test Reports. Test Reports were prepared for each
type of test conducted. Qualification and acceptance test r_ports
were submitted at the CIR for review of their validity and v_rifica-
tion of satisfactory tests° The test report contained an evaluation
of test data, a comparison of test results with test objectives and
design and performance requirements, a listing of anv associated
failure reports, and conclusions based on the evaluation. The report
in many eases also contained an annotated copy of the actual test
procedure.
e. Calibration Data Reports. Where applicable, a Cali-
bration Data Report was prepared from acceptance test results and
became a part of the ADP. _ese reports provided the actual calibra-
tion data sheets for each measurement produced or displayed by the
experiment. For each measurement the report included the following:
Descriptive title of measurement
M_asurcm_nt number
Indicating dcvic_ part number and s_:rial p.umbwr
Compomnt part number and s_rial numl>.r in which tile
indicatin_; doric,, vas ip.stailcd
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Original tabulation of actual calibration data points
Original graph of calibration data
This itlformation was used for data evaluation during integration t_sting
and mission data reduction.
6. Development Status Re_ort. A Development Status Report
was prepared by the ED to provide the status of the total development
effort at each program milestone. The report was an integrated effort
covering the development of all the ED's hardw_re, including GSE. It
included, but _as not limited to, the followin_: i) schedule status,
2) mass properties status, 3) quality assurance, reliability and system
safety sLatus, $) aparen Status, 5) dellvery status.
7. Procedures. The Opera-
ti_}_n_ce __lln8 procedures were prepared by the
ED and included in the _, tO-_flne_ all procedures required during
both flight stud ground usage. The procedures con_a£ned all instruc-
tions for operation, servicing, _inten_ce, calibration, handling,
cleaning, storage, packing and shipping. Any limited-life or time-
critical items were identified and replacement cycles defined. The
procedures included all diagrams, exploded views, sketches, text, etc,
necessary to permit efficient procedure accomplishment. They also
clearly indicated any step which, if not correctly followed, would
result in serious injury to personnel or hardware danmge, and gave
the reason for such warning. The flight hardware OM_ normally con-
sisted of three volumes. Volume I contained a general description of
the hardware and its interfaces; subsystem functional description,
operational and design characteristics, limitations and restrictions;
and controls and displays. Volume II contained the mission operational
procedures for both normal and contingency operations, in a step-by-
step checklist format that was used by the Mission Operations Center
to prepare detailed checklists for the crew. Volume III contained all
n_cessary procedures to accomplish ground operations, maintenanc_ and
handling of the hardware (including recovery operations if applicable);
this volume was used by the Module Development and operations centers
to prepare their detailed test and handling procedures.
8. Data Request Form. _le standard format for the DRF, the
formal instrument for identifying experiment data requirements, is
reproduced in figure A-2. Contents of the various blocks in the DRF
are self-explanatory from their titles.
I
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DATA REQUEST FORM
Skylob Pm gram
R equa st Con tact
DRF C ontml'l'lo.
Ikl alltO
Orgarli zofion
Phene
Refe_ltnce Do_mlmts
Exp/Sy s No.
' PageI of__
Date
Ray; lion '
Per_od af Interest lop. Need Dare
I
Data R oc/pie++t
N OWIII
Address
_eno
Ray Date
,, , , , ,, , ,,
MRD Co_tel_ t
De4_ied lle+,.',e,_t_
Cerements & Explmoti_;
Nme
Oqllml zet_en
pk_e
Siln_re
ii
N_o
O rgcmi soti en
pholqo
Sigha_ro
O.ginomr
,, , Raciest ApnDvol
Dote
_)oto
Nmo
O+'llon+xo_'+oe
pkeme
$ipo_
N_g
0 r|(ll_i |orion
phone
$+g_o_ro
J.teFete;,
_otll
Implemmstlng Agent 7
I)ste
M_FC - Iro+,m US (October Iq?O)
FIGURE A-2, DRF FORMAT
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_ii_i._:iN AL PAG r., ,..:
OF POOR QUALIT_
B. inLcgraciop, Doc '_:tnctlt a k ioil
hltc_ration documents w_r_ prepared to assurw tilat til_ c:-:pcr -
merit interfaces with the program were satisfactorily provided. Be:4in-
ning with the experiment concept, the rcquircmLnLs for program inter-
faces wer_ established and systematically compared _ith progran: capa-
bilities, Requirement documents were prepared which in turn generated
documents that defined the interfaces or identified how the requirements
were to be satisfied. In general, these documents were prepared by or
under the cognizance of the Integration Center or Module Development
Center. Mission operational documentation, which also involves exten-
sive experiment interfaces, is treated separately in Section C.
I. Compatibi_!ity Assessment. When the experiment concept was
originally considered for approval, compatibility analysis was initiated
by the Integration Center. It compared all ex_eriment requirements to
program capabilities and reported the compatible areas as well as incom-
patible areas. Modification of proposed experiment requirements was
often necessary to produce a compatible experiment. After experiment
approval, the compatibility assessment became a recurring integration
document covering total compatibility cf all the integrated experiments.
The review of major problems identified in the compatibility assessment
was supplemented by bimonthly management review meetings held by the
Integration Center and attL_nded by ruprcsuntaLiw:s of the other centers
involved. At these ruvicws, the status of tlw probl,_ms was presented,
a plan agreed to for their solution, and action it_;_s assign_,d (see
Appendix B).
2. gxpcrilncnt Ru_uircm_-nts bOCL'.mwnL. After Li_< _xpcrim_nt v,as
approved, the FDC (or in some cases thw integration u_:ntLr) pr_,parcd all
ERD to specify ti_ cxpcrimc_t r,_quir_'m¢.nts tot r.qodut_ and program inter-
faces. 'fiwsc interfaces could bc of a physical nature, (wlcctrical,
data, control, cr_ , ti_crmal, mechanical, sto\,as_ _, ctc) or prozram
interlaces (intcgratfiol] test req_lircmcnts, number of mission data tal<t:s,
rLcovery requir_mcnts, _:tc). The ERD v as approved by thu ELR; and bccam_
a Level IS baseline document following experiment and module PRRs. As
the program proceeded, various ERD requirements became formalized in
other Level il documents such as ICDs, TCRSDs, and MRD, and were de-
leted from the ERD to avoid r_dundancy. Tabl_: A-If prvs_'nts th_ stan-
dardized ERD outline, as pr_scribud b> an intcrcm_ter "ERD Instructions"
document.
3. Clust_r Rcc_uirem_:nts Specification. Since Skvlab involved
s_vcral modules, an overall intugration specification lor the. assembled
moduh, s (clustvr) v:as l_ouitd :_,ccssar\. Tl_is do_,m_.nt, pr_.parcd b, t}_.
Intt>,_ration C_.I]t_,17, wits idwntilivd as ti_ (_l_s',,r R,.qt:irc::;_:[.q .qp_¢ili-
Citl. iOll ((;l'_.S), _|l_d ,l_p,plil i,d lh,' ;£cilwFdl p, r!OFl:!tl:Iti .!::d dt Hi.':1 i:;t,, ril-
tion rv.quJI-t,,:_v':lts ol t!:v. Sk\lab Pro-:l-ag; Sp_-cili_gttiol_ tw, ,il.%t,l-t li_,tt
TABLE A-II. EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT OUTLINE
I. EXPERI_INT DESCRIPTION
i.i Objective
1.2 Concept
1.3 Experiment Description and Function
1.3.1 Experiment Equipment List
1.3.2 Additional Supporting Equipment
1.4 Relation to Other Experiments
1.5 Cluster Requirements Imposed on Experiment
2. IIISSIONASSIGIqI_ENT AND HA_AIE REQUIREI_IFIS
2. I Flight Assigmmeut
2.2 l_¢atiou _sigzuuent
2.3 _dware R_quire_nts (Number and types of exper_nt end
items)
3. DATA 2E_IJ'/vJ_J_LI@_I_
3.1 Preflight Data Requirements
3.2 In-flight Data Requirements
3.2.1 Experiment Measurement List
3.2.Z Spacecraft Systems Measurement List (Housekeeping)
3.2.3 Photographic Data Requirements
3.2.4 Other In-flight Data Requirements
3.3 Postflight Data Requirements
3.4 Data Return Requirements
3.5 Special Handling Requirements
3.6 Analysis and Processing Support
4. FLIGHT VEHICLE SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Structural and Mechanical Requirements
4.1.1 Weight and Volume
4.1.2 Dimensional Sketches
4.1.2.1 Stowed
4.1.2.2 Operational
4.1.2.3 Post-Operational
4.1.3 Mounting, Alignment and Orientation Requirements
4.1.4 System and Equipment Modifications
4.1.5 Plumbing Requirements
4.1.6 Fluid Requirements (Gaseous and Liquid)
4.1.7 Accessibility Requirements
4.1.8 Observation Access Requirements
4.2 Environmental Requirements
4.2.1 Thermal R_quircm_llts
4.2.2 Atmosphere' Rcquir,_mt nt s
4.2.3 Rad iat io_n ReqiLircm_ I_ts
4.2.4 Lighting R_quircm_i_ts
4.2.5 Other EnviroTlm_11Lal Constraints
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fTABLEA-II. EXPERI>_';NTREQUIREMENTSDOCUMENTOUTLINE(CONTINUED)
4. FLIGHTVEI{ICLESYSTEMSREQUIREMENTS(CONTINUED)
4.3 Electcicai Kcquirclncn ts
4.3.1 Power and Voltage Requirements
4.3.2 Power ProCilc
4.3.3 Other Power Characteristics
4.4 Instrum_q_tation and Communications Requirements
4.4.1 Telemetry System Requirements
4.4.2 Timing System Requirements
4.4.3 Ground Command Requirements
4.4.4 Voice Communication Requirements
4.4.5 Displays and Controls Requirements
4.5 Interface Requirements
4.5,1 Interface Schematic
4.5.2 Interface Identification
4.5.3 Existing Hardware Interfaces
4.6 Ex_ndable Equipment Disposal
5. EX_ERII4ENT ARID FLIGHT VEHIU, LE POI_ING REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Experiment Pointing Requirements
5,1.1 Target Description
5.1.2 Experiment Pointing Accuracy
5.i.3 Allo_ablc Experiment Rates
5.1._ Number of Performances
5.1.5 Duration of Each Performance
5.1.6 Time of Each Performance
5.2 Fli,,_'ht Vehicle Pointing Requirements
5.2.1 Orbit Rcquirwmcnts
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.2.5
5.2.0
5.2.7
Spacecraft Orbital Location Dt_ring Each Performance
Re fort _cc Orientation
Spacecraft Point [rig Accuracy
Alloy able Sp_cecraft Rates
Allowable Spacecraft Acceleration
SpacL:craft Maneuvers Required
6. FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
8.i Experiment Preparation Requirements
6.2 Experiment Operation Requirements
6.3 Post Operation Tasks
6.4 Operation SchL.dulc Constraints
0.5 Crew Traiuin,u, Requirements
6.6 In-flight Maintenance Requirements
7. FLIGHT OPER.,XTIONS REQUIREMENTS
7._ Flit.',!:I St:pport Rwq_lir_mcnts
7.1. 1 Col:a::ap.d List
7.1.2 S_pport R_ quir_mcnt s
7.2 R_co',', rv S_:ppor" Rcql_ir_mt,::ts
7O
TABLE A-II. EXPERIMENT REQUI_MENTS DOCUMENT OUTLINE
8. POSTACCEPTANCE TESTING
8.1 Experiment/Module Integration Test and Checkout
8.1.1 Receiving, Inspection and Handling
8.1.2 Ground Personnel Participation
8.1.3 Integrated Test
8.1.3.1 Test Types
8.1.3.2 Test Locations
8.1.4 Facilities
8.1.5 Data Recording
8.1.6 Ground Support Equipment/Test Equipment
8.1.7 Services
8.1.8 Special Test Constraints
8.2 Prelaunch Checkout
8.3
8.2.I
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4
8.2.5
8.2.6
8.2.7
8.2.8
Ground
Receiving, Inspection, and Handling
Ground Personnel Participation
Prelaunch Test and Activities
8.2.3.1 Test and Activity Types
8.2.3.2 Equipment Utilization
Facilities
Data Recording
Ground Support Equipment/Test Equipment
Services
Special Test Constraints
Personnel Training Requirements
9. RESUPPLY AND REACTIVATION REQUIREMEh_S
9.1 O_ oital Storag_ Requirements
9.2 Resupply Equipment and Materials
9.3 Reactivation Procedures
9.4 Special Rcquircmcnt s
iO. REPORTS OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS
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all ilard\,ar, v.o_:Id suc_,..ssi,_li,, l<1'nctio11 as a2_ i_t,.:<rat_.d s,_stcm_ to
accc)mplisll mission objectives, i'n addi_ioL_, to til<: :4,11...ral r<.(luir_q_',cnts,
Li_ IRS addr_.ss_d so:;,'.<si)<citic cc(lat_-<m<i_/s i-o_7 prima_\ l{_l_ctioi_.al
ar<.as (i.c._ structural, atlitud_ col,troi, L,l__clrica[, control and dis-
pia>, commuuications and data, <_nvironn:cnta[ control, or<q,, and cautio_
&Ild warning liig!lc svst_:ns; ground sFsccms ; and payload rcquir_vncnts
imposed on C]_ _atmch kci_icl_,). It also provided a comprehensive iist-
i_g a_d dcscripcion of all app,-ovid deviations co its C_chnical rcquirc-
III_ I.I t S.
4o Interface Con[ro[ Documents. Once experiment requirements
had been baselined, immediate attention was given to providing the
interface details. These details were documented by the Module Develop-
m_nt Center in ICDs. Preliminary ICDs were reviewed and baselined at
the experiment PDR. Three basic types of ICD were prepared for each
experiment:
Mechanical/Environmental (weight, center of gravity,
attachment provisions, structural loads, thermal
environment, ctc - see Table A-III);
Electrical (type of power, connectors, pin assignments,
wire sizes, etc - see Table A-IV);
Instrumentation and Communication (number of data
measurements, _),pc, sample-, rate, _' - see Table A-V).
in addition to the. cxpcrimcnt-[o-_,_dul_: ICDs, G51C and facility ICDs
wcrv also plTv par, d as llt!ct:ssttl'\ [o dt'fil]t [fly _xpcrir,_v.l_t-to-(;Sl;
and G,qti-tO-l-ac] iitv iut,-rfacc r_quir,_;cnts.
5. Modul_ Spv.cifications and Docum, uts. Paral[_ li_: the
,xp_ rim,,,_ doct_im.n_attop,, t il,' Hod_l_, Dcvcloprm-nt (k, nCv, r prv,p,_r_d a
Nodule. E_,,d [t_'m Sp_ci_icatiol:, _:_od,,_l_ F_zA, and various oth, r intc-
;:ration ciocumcp, t s tidal incorporat,.d _×p,,rtmv.>,t h_fornmtion, f>pica[
of the iatt,,r w_,r, : til,. model, Pow*r Allocation Docun_nt, vi_ich intc-
_rat,d tk.c electrical power r_.qt,.irwmc_:ts og ti.,-,_odt.,lv, s\.st_,ir, s and its
instaltvd cxp,,rim,,nts; module Mcasur,m_.nts Lists, vA',ich id_,ntifivd and
dcfin_d til_ instrumentation and cmnmunications scrvicvs provid,_d b 3
k}_c modt_lw; n'odul, Critical items List (CIL), which summarized all
Cat,got> _ and 2 critical items within Lieu modulu, i:_ciudin 3 thosv.
id_,nt_ificd tot _::.:pcrimcnts; etc.
O. h:,q0v, rir_._n[ l_ntcLration 'lest Rcquircn_cnts and Spwciiications.
As d_scrib_d in Sv, ctio;; V.C, thv Intv:<ration Center coordinat_.d pr,.-para-
tion ol an Eil'RS documwnt which __o_npil_,d posta_cuptancc k_st rwquirw-
i::t :l[s _,: dl_ :!:v" v:.:p, :'i_:, nts, d:_c.; pro\:id, d s_u:_v, iaitO!':lh{' i_i I l-Of [ h
:::od_:l, ,u',d i;:_, "_'at,c s',st,::" ]¢,RSDs. Fi_ t:rv :\- J .q]it)\.,.q tilt t¢)1-111,11 oi kl
:7 p]_ ;',t !,ifR.q p,i:,
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TABLE A-Ill. FIEC_h\NICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL ICD OUTLINE
l. 0 Scope
2.0 Applicable Documc'ats
3 0 Requirements
3.1 Functional Requirements
3.1.i Environmental
3.1.1.1 Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Imposed Enviconments
3.1,1.2 Experiment Required Environments
3. I. 1.3 Experiment Imposed Environments
3.I.2 Interface Loads
(M_x_ Loads at the Attachment Interface)
3.1.3 Mass Properties
(Weight, _ment of Inertia, Center of Gravity)
3.2 Procedural Requirements (If Applicable)
3.3 Physical Requirements
3.3.1 Mechanical (Drawing showing Structural Interface)
3.3.2 Envelope
3.3.3 Axes Definition
3.3.4 Alignment
TABLE A-IV. ELECTRICAL ICD OUTLINE
i. 0 Scope
2.0 Applicable Docum_:nts
3.0 Requirements
3,1 General
3.1.i Abbreviations
3. i. 2 Te rmi no logy
3,1.3 Electrical Characteristics
3.2 Interface Wiring
3.2.1 Connector Designations
3.2.2 Cable Pin Functions
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FABIA.I A-V. LNSI'RU_W, NFAFLON ;\ND COI_IL!NLCATLONS ICD OUTLLNI;
|.l)
2. t)
3. t)
_k" Opt'
AppLicabLL Do, uincnts
Rcqlt i tcnleix t S
3. [ 1",-' [creel ry
3.l.L Data Sir,hal Characteristics
3.L.1. l Analog Measurements
3.1.1.2 Digital Measurements
3.1.2 Signal Conditioning
3.2 Commands
3.3 Timing
3.4 Correlation Data - _asurement originating outside
experiment, required during course of experiment operation.)
3.5 ElectrotMgnetic Compatibility
3.5.1 tlonding
7. Test and Checkout gtac_uircments and Specifications Docun_nts.
The module TCRSDs and the intt'grated system TCRSD were prepared by the
Modulc Dcvc Lopmcnt Cent er and lnt e,;rat iotl Center. These Tt'RSDs defined
the module and Sx'stcm acceptance requirements, specification criteria
Alad constraints tO bc used All prcparing the test i_l'occdul'es. The TCRSDs
utilized the FITRS as tile basis for experiment tcst r.'quircments, The
ntoeJuLt' FL:RSDs wcrc tit ili;:cd ;it tilc lllodttLo t"_lltr;It'tOrtS ,iHd [,ltlllCh sites.
File J,ntc,,.',v;,ltcd s\stcm 'FCRSD was uscd onl.v ;it the [,lunch site. rile FCRSD
lollnAt w,is till' s,llnc aS thr ELTRS without tilt' cttcclixit\ coluuu_s.
8. ['cst Pt'occdurcs. Fk_dtilc :tnd intcF, ratod s\:_tcnl test ing was
pct'lol'mcd in ,tccold,tllCC wttll dct,iiLcd test proccdtn'cs X_'t'iLtCtl i)\" till'
Hodtt[c Dcvctopmcnt t]elltt'l" Or tilt' L;tullch L:ctltt'l tO ,q;lt |St\ till' requilc-
merits and sp,'cit |cat ions ot tilt' t'CRSIJs, l'hc pl'occdul't-!S t.:Ollt,tillcd _t
dt',_Cl'ipt loll oi lilt* tt'._t , test con| i e, tllat ion, sp,,¢i,ll test l'_;qttil't'tlIClltS,
data rcquircmtmts, test ¢wtluation, and step-by-stcp lcSt. pt'F[OHIlSI/Cc
instructioixs. For cxpcrimcnt opcratinr, details, the OH&It m;tnua[ dc-
[ivered with the cxperim,'nt ADP was used. 'rhc EL/; supportrd [that
preparation of tht'st, proccdurcs b\ rcvicw[nF, tllt'm pl-ior t.o thc test.
An :tddcllthml to the test procedure contained a listing ot all tost
anomalies, ;lllonl;iLv descript ions, t I'Otll)[t'shoot in.,', st,,ps and corrective
,l¢ t i 011 t al<cll.
q. lnst,lil,lt ion and Removal Procedures, Based upoix the cxperi-
mcnt OH&It manual, modulc triton:rat ion }'_larts and tilt, ERD, thr Hodult* De-
v,,lopmcnt i't'llit'l" II[SO prL'l_;ir,'d doctu'.lttlts Io1 hiindlin:.:, i_:stdili',x:.'., and
rcn_ox'in)', tilL' cxpcl'ir, leP, ts. T}lcsc procedures cont,lincd, lt,r ,'.l,:<_ sit,',
tilt' ,'II\ il'OlllllL'Ilt;ll illl,[ i:andti_M COilSll,lilltS, ,II'A\,il't:',S llt',','SSill\ IO1
showing complex processes (loadil_g film, installh_g cxpv_riments, etc.),
detaih'd steps for performing installation, removal and refurbishment,
r_fcrencc to all GSg/Facility ICDs, and a list of all GSE required.
C. Mission Operational Documentation
i. Op_rations Dirt_ct[vc _Prosram Direetiw' No. 43_. A series
of formal directives was issued by the Program Director, and controlled
at Level I, to amplify the Program Specification requirements in specific
areas. Program Directive No. 43 officially identified program objectives,
policies and requirements; described the various Skylab missions, their
specific objectives and requirements; and identified mission assignments
and scheduling instructions for the individual experiments.
2. Mission Kequirements Document. The MFd) Frovided the basis
for mission planning and design. It was prepared by the Mission Opera-
ti_sCenter, based upon the Program Specification_ Operations Directive,
ERDs, and Experiment O_ manuals. It defined the integrated functional
and performance requirements to achieve program and mission objectives.
Many subsidiary mission documents were prepared to implement the MRD
requirements. These documents could expand upon, but could not conflict
with the MRD contents.
The l_hl_Dcontained a definition of the mission objectives, a
mission profile description, launch date(s), orbital parameters and
vehicle attitude capabilities. General ground rules relating to in-
flight opt:rations were prescribed for use in flight planning. The MRD
also defined, for each experiment, the detailed test objectives (DTOs),
r_quircm_nts, t_st conditions and types of data required for experiment
accomplishment. The te_t coildi[ions described the environmental limi-
tatio_s, pointing requirements, vehicle attitude stability, electrical
tol_'rances and all otht_r constraints p_rtinent to cxp_'rimcnt op_ratio_].
The _,D was updated and expanded in periodic r_vi<._,; cycles,
u_ldcr Level i1 change control.
3. Flight Plan. The Flight Plan, prepared by the Mission
Operations Center, was a detailed _chedule of all in-flight crew
activities. It responded directly to the bkRJ) and endeavored to satisfy
all requirements and constraints specified therein, l_t' scheduled
activities for each crewman were laid out relative to a time base,
usi_g operation times which had been verified duril_g crew training
sessions. In additiol_, the summary timelint' format (see figure A-4)
provid_:d a simultaneous display of r_'lated data such as da\ and night
periods, beta angle, ground station contact times, vu_]t times and tape'
fht _capi_i_ai pr_sunLation utilized ii_ tia< Fli4ht Plan faciii-
tat,:d t!_, idcntificatio_ of co_fiictin_ ruquir_._.unts and constraint
7@
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violaLions. Although not Lii_d_r formal ch_Ingc control, th_ Flight Plan
v as under continual revision, and _auh publicaLion v as widely distri-
Dutcd for review and con_1_cnt, l_hc information rt_quir_d to produce tiw
Flight Plan was updated as required and stored in a data bank for use
during tile mission in ti_c computer-controlled, real-time Flight Plan
generation.
4. Stowage List. Stowage lists were compiled and maintained
by the Mission Operations Center to identify and track the proper loca-
tion of all moveable equipment in the Skylab modules throughout the
mission(s). The lists highlighted the article's identification, weight,
cumulative quantities launched and returned, and the planned stowage
locations for launch, in-flight transfer, and return. A sample Stowage
List format is reproduced as figure A-5.
5. _ht Mission Rule_______s.The Flight Mission Rules were a com-
pilation of preplanned responses to possible in-flight contingencies.
They were prepared before the missions, and attempted to anticipate
anomalies which might occur during flight, together with appropriate
corrective actions. These rules were designed to reduce the response
time required to cope with anomalous situations during the mission.
They _ere crucially important in those instances where a particular
malfunction might compromise crew or vehicle safety, thereby demanding
in_ediate action. In less urgent circumstances, they assumed an ad-
visor}, role, describing the previously agreed-upon action-to be followed
after the: anomaly's criticali'v had been determined (see Malfunction
Procedures, item _ belo_,_).
O. _.rim_ent Oi0_ration,- tlandbook. 'flw LOH x, as published fn
t_,o volumes. Volumw I _,as system oriented and provid,,d _-xp_:rimcnt
d_'scriptions. Volume ii contain_:d d_.tailed normal, backup, and mal-
function operational procedures tor these ,,'<pv'rim_.nts. As StlCh, this
document provid_:d tht preliminary input for cr,e_, training purposes and,
v.[tll fL_cdback krom training, lorm_:d tb._' basis for ti_v cr_w ct:ecklists.
7. Crew, Checklists. The crew experiment chc, cklists wcr_
detailed, step-b3-ste p proc_,-dur._-s to by followed tot prop_.r _'xperiment
operation, included in ti_e onboard Flight Data File. The MR,D, experi-
ment OH&H, acceptance and integration test results, EOH, and crew
training experience wL:rc tile principal inputs for these documents.
They x_crc updated as r<quir_,d durin_ the mission bx the _:zound support
crex, at tlw Mission Opwration._ C_:nt¢.r (e..g., to provide specific co-
ordinatvs ot an _.:<p_:rimcnt tarsct).
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or v,orl, arou!_d l_a_Iv faiLur_,s, fi_c Na_f_mct[o_. Proccdt_r_s, included i_
l',_ ollboard Fiii_'h[ Data Fi[_', provided Li_c crL_ _,[th [o?,icai steps to
b_. [oiio_,cd _h_ ap.omalics occurL-cd. ']Thcst procedures, _.xprcsscd in
biocl< diagram format, wcr_' dcsigt_cd to rapidl_ isolal_, th< anomaly to
tilt subsF'st_m or- component _,,hich had tailed and, \_hc::_. possibl_' and
applicable, described a r_pair mt:ti_od or alternate, pcoccdurc whi<h
would pt'rmi[ continued operation. In tilL! CVelIt that the maikunction
procedure did not result in a satisractory repair, the' applicabiu mis-
sion rule was invoked.
9. O_rational Data Book. During the mission, there may be
occasions when the limit of certain design tolerances may be approached
or exceeded, necessitating appropriate action. The ODB was a compila-
tion of the operational perforce daEa and limitations of all vehicle
and experiment hardware. From the experimenter it required a descrip-
tion of the mass properties, structure znd dynamics of the equipment,
the effect of ex_r_n _ oPeration on the spacecraft environment, the
nature of the load it presented ito the electrical power system, data
instrumentation requirements, experiment pointing capabilities and all
operational limitations and hardware constraints.
I0. Sk>.lab Experiment Systems Handbook. The SESH was a com-
pilation of experiment functional flow diagrams and, where applicable,
mechanical and _lectrical schematics, for use by the flight controllers
during the missions. It was design_d to assist in [i_c rapid resolu-
tion of real-time cxperim_.ut anomalies. PertincnL operational and
system constraints were iaentificd, as ,,.'vr_-th, interfaces between
II. Facility Us_:rs tiandbook. ,ks part of a_ Am_ounc_m_nt of
Fligi_t Opportunity, advising thL" sci=ntific con_nunit_ off ti_- avail;_-
bilitv of aa cxp_-rim_:nt facility (e.g., ERJ-ZP), a Facility Users tJand-
book was prcpar_,d by the: Exp_.rimc.ut Dcvclopmt_nt (;_:ntcr for distribu-
tion to pot_,ntial us_.rs. 'lhc handbool< id_:ntifiu.d the' physical/fu,_c-
tionai ci_aracc, ristics .'_d operational capabilities of the _a¢ility
and its individual instruments.
_I_
APPENDIX B
i
!
ii
ii
!
F i
i
COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT
T_ OF C_TE_S
CG_I'ATIBILII_f ASSESSEdCf ................ ....
Figure
B-I
B-2
B-3
LIST OF ILLUSTFATION$
Title
Experiment Compatibility Documentation {Sample) . .
Experiment Compatibility Summary (Sample) .....
Compatibility Probl_m Description and Status (Sample)
Page
82
86
87
88
Table
B-I
LIST OF TABI_._S
Tit ic
Experiment Compatibility Disciplines ....... 84
41
i-i ¸ :
_c
7
CO}tPA'I iS ILI II" ASSESS>_iEI
A ma)or fcaLurc Of Skviab u:ipcrimcnt int_gration activiti<.s was
th< _ continuin,,a compatibikit\ assessment performed b\ the. i_ltcgratio[]
Center. This activity assurp_,d various forms as th_ program developed.
During the program's formative stages, when many different
missions and configurations were being considered, an extensive assess-
ment was conducted to categorize over five hundred available or potential
experiments into compatible, discipline-oriented payload groupings for
performance on particular types of missions. While the early concept
of numerous dedicated missions did not survive, these assessments were
influential in selecting the initial experiment complement for the con-
figuration and missions that were implemented.
Subsequently, as new experiments were proposed for MSFEB con-
sideration, an initial compatibility assessment was necessary in each
case, to evaluate the impacts of tl,e experiment requirements upon all
other hardware and operational aspects of the program. Any incompati-
bilities identified v'cre rcsotw.d bofor< the _'xpcriment was approved
for implement at ion.
rhureaft_'r, a continuing surwti!lance was maintained of all per-
[i:It.n[ t)ro.._ram doctnn_ntation, [nformaLion and activities to assure that
L_l, _xpt. ri?!v.ll[ rv.quirvm_nts and co;_.straints r,n_,a[:_,d co::_.patibl< v,i,i_
all i_.tcrfacf_=: citIstcr and modui, svst,,',.s a:_d op_ratto:',al plans.
\..i_v.r_: incompatibiliti_,'s w_r_: id__nti{icd, tile lntc,gration c,.nt,.r coor-
dinat,d and participat,.d in tiwir r<sot,_tio_. All invo[v,d a<<nci,:s
(Pi, LD, EDC, Modui_, Dv.v_.iopwr/'DLvelopnq__.ni C,.l_t,.r, op_:ratiol_,s c_nt_rs,
_:tc., as applicable) wcru cop.suit,,, aild mt.,tuatlv itcccptabic, solutions
_.stabiisil_.d. Eormail,, the: Int,_:_"_ation <<nt{'r prcparv.d and "pr,.coor -
dinat,:d" any ncc_-ssarv CiI&II'_'C D'iC[i&b_t" IOf s_l)mittaf to ti_. co. nizant
CGB _sce S,.-ckion IX) "._nd maintait_:d correctly, action impium_:ntation
status. _',hvn significant hardwar_ cha_?_.s w_:r,: involved, ti_c affwct_:d
hard_,are d_.,v,.]opcr was rcsponsibl<: for prv, paration of thw ECP.
Many special studi<,s were also conduct_d to ass_.ss th¢ compati-
bility of associated :4roups ol v:xp,_rim,,nts with t[i_.ir tom,non module
interfaces. Some examples w_.r_:: mul_i-cxpurin;_.nt usa:_.v of thw Scien-
tific Airlocks, modcil_ provisions lot stor_,g,, and ,:_viro_-mv.ntal pro-
tcction of assort<_d ,::<p_.rim_':'_ pi_oto>:raphic film, launch pad ac_,.ss
r,:quircmc_ts for uxperim,_nts, _tc.
The various compatibility assessment activities continued at a
high level throughout the definition, development, and integration
pha_es, and ss a monitoring and evaluation function during the mission
support phase. Table B-I identifies and defines the general scope of
the 17 experiment compatibility disciplines that were initially checked
and subsequently monitored for these assessments. Figure B-I presents
a matrix of the pertinent program documentation that was continually
reviewed in the various discipline areas.
Management visibility of the experiment compatibility status
was provided by oral presentation of bimonthly reviews, and by broad
dissemination of a monthly Experiment Compatibility Status Report.
Representatives of the module development, launch, and mission opera-
tions centers attended the bimonthly reviews and received the status
report. A key feature of the monthly report was a compatibility sun_ary
of the status of each Indlvld_l experiment relatiwe to each of the 17
co_patlbillty disclpllnes (see figure B-2). The smmsry was supplemented
in the report by detail_idescr£pelons of current problem areas and their
resolution sta_as, including action items and suspense dates where
applicable (see figure B-3). O_ce entered, problems could be closed
and deleted from the status report only by issuance of a CCBD correct-
ing the incompatibility, or by some equivalent positive action accept-
able to the Integration Center.
The evolution of these integration techniques provided a very
effective means for the timely control of Skylab experiment compati-
bility.
_J3
TABLE B-i
I)l,qC IPLI El-]
>lechanica t
,_eight and
S towage
Consumables
Electriea I
Ins t rumen tat ion
and
(_ommun ica t ion :_
Environments
Materia Is
I2"(PI_RI>IILXT CO>IPATIt11LITY I)ISCIPLINES
I)EFINIT [()N
Verific;_tion that experiment mechanical interface re-
quireuents ;ire :net for mounting, alignment, orienta-
tion, plumbing, w, nting, _ealing, and the use of
obserwltion window_.
Verification of current experiment weights relative
to experin_ent and module control weights; of experi-
ment stowage provisions in terms of weight, volume,
and location for each launch, orbital storage and
return operation in the mission; and that all onboard
experiment support equipment is available at the time
and in the quantities required.
Verification that experiment requirements for oxygen_
nitrogen_ water, and/or other constm_bles will
supplied either by the modules or by the experim=-nts
theras e lye s.
Verification that experiments are compatible with
the electrical power provided by the module (voltage
tolerances, power profile, and total energy); that
all electrical interfaces are compatible (connectors,
cables, etc.); and that EMI produced in the electri-
cal system will not causL._ unacceptable d_gradation
of the system or experiments.
Verification that e×periment measurements, house-
keeping _easurements, voice co_mnunication, and ground
co!amanda required for the vxperi:-lcnts, will be provided;
that experiment equipment, data lOl'_!ldtS_ /llld data rat_:s
will be compatible with module requirements for record-
tag and transmission to ground, and with MNC r_:quirc-
::,eats for processing and di_q_lay; that all data
correlation requirements (e.g., time, ephemeris, etc.)
will be provided for; and that experiment-required
data will not be lost due to E)!I.
Verification of exper'ment compatibility with prelaunch,
launch, orbital and recovery environments (temperature,
humidity, pressure, acoustic, vibration, acceleration,
shock, radiation, illumination) as specified in the
CRS or defined by NASA-recognized analyses; _nd of crew
and system compatibility with experiment-induced en-
vironments.
VerificatLon that experiment materials are acceptable
in accordance with the :_ppropriate specifications as
referenced in the (;!_S, or that w_ivers to these snec-
ificatiop._ havo been approved.
TABLE B-I EXPERIMENT COMPATIBILITY DISCIPLINES (Cont.)
DISCIPLINE DEFINITION
i
Contamination Evaluation of experiment susceptibility to contamina-
tion from internal or external sources; determination
of contamination produced by the experiments; and
verification of ground contamination control procedures.
Photography Verification that experiment photographic requirements
are met, including photographic support equipment
(cameras, lenses, light, cables, etc.) and film; and
that adequate environmental protection is provided
for film.
Experiment
and Spacecraft
Pointing
Verification that experiment pointing requirements
will be met when integrated into the spacecraft; and
that requirements imposed on the spacecraft, including
orbit position for performsnce_ orientatiom_ ItabilltT,
allowable rates and accelerationsj and the necessary
nmneuvers_ will be provided for.
SafeSt Verification of experiment safety plans and provlsions
for on-orblt operatlo_s.
Systems Test Verification of compatibility of all experiment handling,
test and checkout plans with integration test planning,
prelaunch maintenance, logistics, pad access, and launch
cons tra ants.
Ground Support
Equipment, Facil-
ities and ;landling
Verification that GSE and facilities provided will
satisfy the experiment postacceptance handling and
testing requirements with minimum duplication.
Flight
Plans
Verification of flight plan compatibility with experi-
ment requirements, priorities, objectives, constraints,
and interfaces.
Crew
Interfaces
Verification of experiment-to-crew interfaces, includ-
ing in-flight access, restraints and aid_, controls and
displays, in-flight maintenance, and crew training.
Mission
Support
Verification of plans for obtaining required evalua-
tion data; for processing, display, analysis, and
reporting oi this data in support of the mission;
and for analysis and reporting after the' mission.
Schedules and
Hardwart_ Status
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'['his Appendi× descrilws tilL' rcquircmcp, ts. r('spol,.qibilities a.d
methodology for accomplishment of the formal rcvi('ws .1.d certifications
_,IItcil wore key development chccl<points for Skvlab cxpcrimei1Ls. The
sew'. key mauagement checkpoints established by Skylab Program D[rectiw,
No. iI were:
PRR - Preliminary Requirement * Review
PDR - Preliminary Design Review
CDR - Critical Design Review
CIR - Configuration Inspection Review
COFW - Certification of Flight Worthiness
DCR - Design Certification Review
FRR - Flight Readiness Review
The Experiment Bevelopment Center was responsible for accomplishment of
the first five of these (PRR, PDR, CDR, CIR and COFW) at selected end
item levels. The last two reviews (DCE and FRR) were program-oriented,
eucompassing the total mission complex; they were accomplished through
coordinated efforts of the development, integration, launch, and mission
operations centers, and were conducted in a different format by the NASA
lleadquarters Program Director. Experiment involvement in the DCR and
FRR is described in Section VI of the main text.
Each development r_'view was a critical c×amination of documentation
and pertinent hardware for compliance with pro;_ram requirements and for
compatibility with related hardware and facilities. 'rh_, reviews progressed
chronologically from req_trements (PRR), to design (PDR, CDR), to hardware
acceptance (CIR) and formal certification (COFW). I'ach successive check-
point provided a more comprehensive assessment of program accomplishment
as it matured.
A. Purpose and Scope of Reviews
I. Preliminary Requirements Review. The purpose of a FRR. was
to verify by formal review the suitability of the conceptual configuration,
and to establish a Program Requirements Baseline that would satisfy the
experiment objectives and provide the basis for preliminary design. Review
r_aterial included the experiment proposal, the approved EIP, the Compati-
bility Assessment, the EDrs Statement of Work (SOW), and initial versions
of the ERD and EIS. The PRR established:
A preliminary I-IS for the conceptual flight hardware configu-
ration that would be expected to meet mission obiectivcs and
the required schedule.
i
q
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O Operational requirements of the experiment on the module,
crew, launch, flight and recovery, as reflected in the
preliminary ERD.
o Required end items and schedule.
Feasibility and/or development tests required to select
and substantiate design approaches.
Minutes of the PRR were prepared, as described in Section A.2.d of
Appendix A, and included all items requiring post-review action. These
action items were to be completed prior to final approval of the Program
Requirements Baseline.
2. PTelin[tnary!_sign Review. The purpose of a PDR was to
verify by f_rmal review the basic design approach for the har_tare, prior
to proceeding with detail design, and thereby to establi_ a Design
Requirements Baseline. The PDR established:
o The integrity of the design approach, by review of design
analyses, breadboard models, mock-ups, circuit logic
diagrams, packaging techniques, test and study results,
reliability analyses, et_.
o The compatibility of the design approach with EIS perfor-
mance and design requirements, including interface compati-
bility with other flight hardware, the flight crew, GSE and
facilities. This was accomplished by review of preliminary
design drawings, layout drawings, envelope drawings,
schematics, per£ormance characteristics for functional
compatibility, and available test results.
The producibility of the design approach with respect to
cost and schedule impact, through the review of requirements
for special tools, equipment, and facilities to manufacture,
inspect and test the hardware.
The adequacy of the planned test program for the end item,
by review of preliminary test plans.
o The acceptability of the design requirement base, line con-
figuration, through approval of the design approach.
Minutes of the PDR were prepared and included all items requiring post-
review action. These action items were to be co_:ipleted prior to formal
approval of the Design Requirements Bast'line configuration.
3. C:'i.t :,.,t[ D,:s::':: Rc\icu. li:,'purpose' ol ;t C:DR \,<is :o
,.,tit\ b\ form,if_ tcci:nica[ r_\i_'\,' ti:_'co:::pl__.t,'ddctai, t d_'si,u: ol tile
i:.irdx,ar,', :tv, d to _.stahti.s:_ ,: prodt:ctio:: l)v,lwJ.:::,3::scti,w b,,torc ti_c
d<'sit:n was rckc,iscd lot :ua::t:l:tctttrc. t'h,' CI)R .,.sta.bkisi:c,::
['itc il:k,'}vri, t5 ol ti:c comp[c:,'d d,.>_i_,::, h\ review ot
the drawin_:s t:ts prepared for rcleas, to mmmfactut'-
[ng), analyses, mock-ups, quaiitication status of
selected parts and materials, test data, insp_'cta-
bi/ity, etc.
Compatibility oil the completed design with _:IS per-
forlnance and uesign requirements, as revised since
PI_. This included the exact physical and functional
interface relationships with other flight hardware,
the flight crew, ESE and faeilities,
o The product ion baseline configuration for manufacture
of the hardware, through approval u£ the completed
dcsi,;n and associated documentation.
Adequacy of the planned test program, b\, baselining
t lie Qual i ficat iota and Accep_/lllCC [?us[ Spt!c i ticat ions.
Adequacy of the dcsi,qn 1. rum a satct\ standpoi-nt,
II_rou,',l_ a r, vi<_, of design details and t:'st rt,sutts.
.\d,qunc) oi ti:c d_,sJ:,,l_ lot op<.ratio::s, b\ rcvic\,' oi
cnrzi_::,cri:::; siim:l.ations, It'sts and sty:d\ rvsults and
l_" t'X/llllill/tt io:_ ol u:ock-ttps_ up, l-ill i!h,., pl-_c,._ltlr, s, ,lild
S',.'glt'::: pt't'|tll't!t/-lllt't ' ti<t( it.
I'lintici's ol the t:l)l< t,','rc prcpilrcd :iiht illcludcd ,ill items rc-
c:,i[l-i::;', post-rc'.i<'w ;l<'t loll. l'll<'.'._" .lt't toll ilcnls x,,'l, Io bt' compl_,'tcd
i. rior to) i:olui.i[ .lppt-oval or- the lsas,,[[il:, coilli/ui';lt loll to)r" :::;l::utac-
t ill" i 11!\.
4. Conlit_uration inspcct ton Review. t'i_c pttrposc of a C1R
was to vcrit) b) formal tcciiilica[ review tlicit the cOllt[,rtutTi.lt[olt ol
the end item as being ot[t r_'d lor d,.,Livcry was il: conforiuaiicc _ith
t iiv basv I i_ic cs t ,tb 1 i sll<'d ,it (:DR (:is mud i i i _.<1 b\. approved chala.,..,cs) .
17his was accolupiisiicd b\- ,.st,lhii.shJi::,- the c-<:lct relationship ot th,'
v'lld itcln ;is d,.,scribt'd b\- l-t,[t,ast, d t'll)',illt't'liil)'_ doctinltiltatiol/ to tilt
v'ild i[Cl:: ,is l:l<Iiltl[dctt:tc'd ;llld ,lShc'F.,ii) J,cd. '17!iv C[R was most cificii'ut 1\"
cO!latter , vt ill [\,0 pi:,lS, S:
<'2
Phase L - Approximate[\ one wcck prior o sldv_ of final_
cxpcrhnci_[ [laL'd\.:Arc Acccpttlzlcc test S, re\ few tile
@.ta]-[t teat I_On Status and test d.zt_l, coz_t i_-urdtio_l
and overall status of ttw cml item and its GSE.
Phase 2 -ApproximateLy onc wcck prior to deliver\', rcvtcw
the final t, xperimcnt hardware acc_2pkancc Lest data.
The CIR established:
O That the hardware to be accepted conformed to the pro-
due_io_ Nseti_ ¢on££gu_ation, as documented _ the
released engineerlng, £nc.|uding aU approved , .. nges;
and that the coufiguratiOn o£ the Quall£ication Test
hard.age ¢orreapo_ed to the con£1gurat'_on of the
fl_t.__ _t._. he a¢_e.epted ...................
o That the test program of the Verification Plan had been
completed and that the verification methods and test
results validated the acceptability o_ the hardware.
0 That all failures occurring after CDR bad been reported
and corrective action completed.
That Fa'lure Mode and Effects Analyses had been com-
plett, d a_d were acceptable.
That the Acceptance Data Packa,.:c was complete and
accept able.
The validity of th,:' hardware acccplancc tcst in_,
verified by ;1 direct comparison of acceptance test
data wttll EIS pcrtormance and dcsi,,.,n r,,quircmcnts
and bx v,,rification that thc acceptant,, Icsts had
been conducted in accordance with the approved
Acceptance Test Specification and procedures.
O A plan for accomptishing any open work items remain-
ing Lot fulfillment of the above requtrem,'nts,
O Idtmtit'ication of all _,'aivcrs, dcviat ions or
short ages authorized.
'£he results ot the CIR were documcut_.d ill a t;IR Report (s_.c Appcudix
A, s,,ction A.2.,_.).
). Ccr( it icat i ol_ ol Fli}iitt I_ovtlti(wss. fil_ tm,t)os_ _)1 [i_,,
COFK mi. lt'stonc \,as Io c, v; i!\ ti_at _,zv't_ ,xp, rim_ ,;_d it,_:: x,,t.,, ,_ _t>_:,,-
plctt' and qudlilicd item ol iiArdw,lrt prit_r to .';hipm,_l , ;lnd v,ls ;i<com-
p.illicd t)\" ,Idt'qtl;Itc suppor[iil}: dot'tlli/tllli|[ iOil. I'll, {i0|"l', _,,1:, pl-c'[lill-td
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7prior Lo shipment from tlw point o_ _ra_:_.facturc and endorsed b\ the
EL_',. rhc COFW ccrti[[cd that:
Complete specifications and drawings hid bccn developed
in accordance witil all program requirements. Addition-
all>, that the c.xacL relationship of the }_ardwarc as
mallul_ackurcd and assembled had bccn established, d|ld
that shortages requiring resolution prior to FRR had
been indicated on the DD-250 form.
Acceptance, qualification, and any required reliability
demonstration tests had been successfully completed and
had met specification requirements.
o Departures from specification and drawing requirements
had been approved by Material Review Boards in accord-
ance with EIS requirem=.nts.
Critical hardware f_ilures had been reported, analyzed,
and corrected in accordance with EIS requirements.
o The hardware qualification program had been satisfac-
torily accomplished.
o The hardware was complete and in accordance with the EIS.
Data for operation and checkout was compttte and corn-
pat i bi.
lutcrfact ColItI'oI. DOCtl|l_v'lltrequirements had bccI1 met and
interface compatibilit\ was ccrtilicd.
Shipping and transportability rcquirtm_nts as slated in
the i:iS ilad l)ccn rock.
Dclivory status information as ruquircd in Lhc EIS was
c omp 1 c t c.
o l'hc DD-230 £orm was ready for signature.
When equipment was shipped to an intermediate destination
(center test iac ...... \" or developer's plm/t) for additional work,
further sign-off of the COFW by the cognizant center was required.
Eventually, upon completion of the FRR, thc COFW was jointly endorsed
by the Laup.ch Center and the EDC.
!ii
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B. Rcvie_ Formal and AcLivities
The revi_w description and requiremelILs contained in tills
section were generally applicable to all d_welopmtmt r_,vicws; bo_cvcr,
flexibility was permitted to meet the requirements of each experiment
review. For example, the formal procedure of using Review item Dis-
crepancy (RID) forms to document problem areas was properly followed
for major reviews (e.g., for modules or complex experiments), but was
occasionally supplanted by a simple Action Item Log to accomplish the
same purpose in reviews of the less complex _xperiments. This flexi-
bility was implemented by a Ibeview A_enda prepared spec£flcally for
each experiment review by the cosnizanC E_C.
Review personnel consisted of; l) rev£e_ cemmL o_ working
groups, representing each appropriate technical discipline or program
interest, to conduct the detailed technical review; 2) a preboard, to
perform a screening and advisory functlon; and 3) the review board, to
direct the proceedings and make final disposition of all pertinent re-
view items. The board and preboard normally included representation
from the EDC, NASA Headquarters, the Integration Center, the operations
centers, the ED and the P1 or Projecl Scientist. The designated cap-
tains of the review teams also served on the preboard.
i. Preparations. The cognizant EDC schcdulcd the review
date(s) and site, and appointed the review board cllairman, who in
turn selected his preboard d_airman and team captains. Approximately
two months in advance, this group prepared the Review Agenda, notifying
invited participants of review objectives and personnel, sessic i
timing, applicable documents to be made avaiiabl_, and plann_d devia-
tions from normal review procedures, if aay. AL least two weeks prior
[o PRR, PDR, or CDR, the EDC or ED delivered to each parLi¢ipant a data
package, consisting of updated plans, the appropriate technical docum_'n-
tation, and RID forms. Participants were exp_¢t_.d to familiarize them-
selves witl_ the documentat_o._, and identify suspected discrepancies and
problems, in advance preparation for the review.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Apply the following criteria ill prepara-
tion for experiment development reviews. For maximum
effectiveness, each review, must:
o Be conducted aL the appropriate time--in particular,
not prematurely with rcspccL to data dufinition and
availability.
Invc)J.vc tiw most cxpcricu¢_,.d lcchl_ical p, rs,._lm_ l
available, to _ovcr till dis_'iplin,'s tilat ;llI_J[ [_.i,
review, subj,.el.
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FLimit participants to the required disciplint: a11d
project r_,prescntatives, authorized to act for
th<'ir rcsp_ctivc or_ianizations (including a single
source of crow comments,consistent from one rcvit.w
to the next).
Have a data package that is complete, but minimal
in volume, available to all participants sufficiently
early to permit thorough evaluation.
o Emphasize hardware as available.
o Include assessment of test programs and results.
2. Technical Review. Technical reviews began with a general
technical briefing by the EI_/ED, to provide all review participants
with common background information on development status and technical
requirements and final instructions as to review procedures, criteria,
and guidelines.
Due to the relative complexity of the review materials, indi-
vidual team sessions were scheduled for each applicable technical and
management discipline° The team sessions opened with detailed presen-
tations to assure maximum understanding of the technical materials
subject to review in the team's defined area of responsibility, as
interpreted by the team captain. The rLn'aindcr of the team sessions
_crc dcvot_.d to in-depth examination und discu_:'ion of the review
material, leading to the generation, r_'view and coordination of RIDs,
and development of rcconm_cndations for tl_cir disposition. The MSFC
standard RID format is sho\m in figure C-1. rhc tL:am nk_mbers sub-
mitred their discrepancies/problems to the team captain to assure
prop.,r format, completeness, clarity-, coordination, and tt_at the
cm_tcnt was v, ithin scope of the review guidt:lines and criteria. After
his review the team captain could rucommcend to the originator tl_at
the KID be withdra_, rewritten or combined with another RID o_ the
sazn¢ intc_t. }towevcr, a_y action or changes to a RID during tbc team
meeting and subsequent activities r._._quircd tht concurrence of the
originator. RIDs approved for submittal into the review data flow
were logged, submitted for the developer's response, and coordinated
with other review teams as required. The dcw loper's appointed lead
repr.,scntativc for each team plovidcd or made rwadil_ available the
supporting documentation, analysv, s or explanations required to clarify
or resolve quwstionablc areas encountered during the review, lie also
coordinated p!cparation of the developer's rcsponst to submitted RIDs,
providv.d lia! ". l-or ,oordinatin:q tiw team's acti\'itics x, itl. orb.or
twill."; _ diltl t)[ d t,.am n,,inut_ s.
,i
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I. TYPE OF REVIEW:
2. iTEM:
3. DATE:
6. fNITIATOR:
tO, TITLE:
REVIEW ITEM DISCREPANCY
,t
7. ORGANIZ'ATION':'-" 8. SYSTEM:
4. NUM8ER:
5. COORDINATION:
9. TEAM NAME:
11_ hi SC.REPAN¢ Y/PROllLEM:
13. IIECOMIEROI[0 01$P0S'TI011:
1,5. D[VEL.0PER'S COMMENT:
|4. TEAM CAPTAIN'S SIGNATURE:
116, • . . -
SIGNATURE:
' " 17. ;::'R'E[- B O A R D RECOMMFNC)AT IONS
• .
L17.2 CATEGORY: 17. I REMARKS:
17,3 ACTIO.:
17.4 SUSPENSE: l?.S PRE-BOARO SIGNATURE:
- .... ,,, n •
le. FORMAL _EVlEW eOARD ACTIC_
18., S:SPE.SE:
18. i _ DISAPPRovED
18.2 REMARKS:
18.5 [] APPROVEG
19 DATE: - _ " _'0 SICN*'tURE _)r" eOAR'O r.A*R_AN:
_k(_F C - rorm 3214 t_Y I9_g)
FIGURE C-1. MSFC RID FO!_\T
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73. Pc_board ¢_chioll. flit' prcboard cm_vcncd, bc, iorc the board
m_cting, to scr_.en and categorize, all RIDs submitt_.d by the, rLvie_,
teams. Ea¢l_ RID was consid_,rL.d individually b\" th,. pr_board, comhincd
uith oth_rs whcr_' possible, and assigned to 0_1<, eL the i;olleu'in;- rc.com-
m_'nd_d disposition categories:
A. Recommend acceptance as written
B. Recommend acceptance with (stated) modifications
C. Recoramend acceptance for study
D. Recommend rejection
E. Refer to board for resolution
The total RID package, accompanied by pertinent data to support the
recommendations, was then submitted to the review board for final
disposition.
4. Review Board Action. The board reviewed the RID package
and, after considering the preboard's recommendations, either approved
or disapproved each presented RID. Suspense dates were established
for all items requiring further action. (As noted previously, the
formal RID procedure was replaced in some reviews by a simple Action
Item Log.) The o£ficial revie_ minutes (or CIR Report) provided the
formal documentation of the board's actions and directions.
5. Follow-Up Action. The ENd was r_spoi_sib[c for assuring
satisfact-or\- review follov,'-clp, i.e., that approx',.d RiDs _,ccrc implc-
mcnt._,d, dir_,ctcd studies complct,.d, tlil_l approp_ !_ikt, action takcn to
close all rc.111_lil_iil:= open it,,ms b\ the pr_.sLrib_d susp_.nst, datL,s.
Upon completion of all rcquii-cd lo[[ow-up acii\'it,, Ii_. l inal rc\'i_.\,,
mi_,,_tcs ,,,t.r,. pr,.par, d and distribut<d b_ oil<-l_il2, documcntin:4 the
closuout actions and dat_.s, dild c_,rtifyinl- to ti_c. Program Director
tilat tlt_: l-cvit,w objectives }lad be, on met.
IU:iCOI_R,ILNDATION: En_phas[zt- tll_' importance ot adequate
follow-up and formal cioscout of all RIDs or review
action itc_ms, and tiraclv dissemination of this infor-
raation to all involvt, d program pcrsonnci.
_b
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DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The following experiment design considerations are categorized into
those applicable to flight hardware and those applicable to GSE. These
considerations _ere usually specified as requirements in either the CRS
or the experiment EIS. Some considerations were only indirectly applic-
able to design (i.e., identifying operational methods or procedures that
might influence the design). The importance of applying these design
criteria was directly related to the criticality category of the experi-
ment_ i.e.:
Category I: Hardware whose failure could adversely
affect personnel safety.
Category 2: Hardware whose failure could result in not
achieving a primary mission objective, but
would not adversely affect personnel safety.
Category 3: Hardware whose failure could result in not
achieving a secondary mission objective, but
which would not adversely affect personnel
safety or preclude the achievement of any
primary mission obiective.
Category 4: ltardware whose failure would not result
in any of the above.
A. Flight l{ardware
i. Flight Operation_encrai C onstrainLs
a. Safety of the crew and safe termination of the mission
were overriding design criterie.
b. All components that controlled safety-critical functions
were required to be designed to operate in a vacuum. This was consid-
ered a requirement even for hardware nor,nally located in a pressurized
environment.
c. Efforts were made to minimize the number of single fail-
ure points (SI:Pq? in the design; rationale to justify acceptance of
those St::'s that did exist wa_ a prime con_i,teration i_: design and
acceptance reviews . }{t,dtlnd/!llt svste:ls , how_,\,ol, Welt' to be pro\,i,te,1
only if considered necessary to ensure crew safety or primary mission
success.
d. Wherever possible, opportunities for human error were
minimized by designing connecting parts (e.g., fluid line or electrical
connectors that might be reversed in mating) so that they would be
physically incapable of being installed improperly.
e. The experiment was designed to satisfy its own objectives,
independent of the failure of another experiment.
f. Wherever feasible, flight-proven hardware was utilized in
the design.
g. The module generally provided the followin_ subsystems:
I) Data Recording, 2) Power Distribution, 3) Pressurization, 4) Attitude
Control, 5) Voice Commanications, 6) Atmospheric Circulation, 7) Module
Lighting, Food, Water and Waste Management, and 8) Central Caution and
Warning System.
2. Fli_ht Operation Mechanical Constraints
a. All experiment hardware having a crew interface was re-
quired to remain within touch temperature limits of 55°F to 105°F.
b. The following types of hardware were required to be
delivered to the Module Development Ce_ger:
(I) Mechanical interfaces tool (a tool that could be
used to verify mechanical interlaces prior to installation; e.g., to
locate bolt holes).
(2) One full-scale mock-up of the experiment that, as
a minimum, satisfied mechanical and crew interfaces.
(3) One flight unit.
(4) One complete set of GSE capable of verifying inter-
faces and checkin_ out the experiment to acceptance test requirumcnts.
c. Packaging. Experiment equipment which was stowed during
the launch phase of the mission, and then transferred to a use location,
was required to satisfy the following specifications:
(I) Package limited in size2to 20" x 25" x 40" and in
moment of inertia to less than 65 Ib-in-sec , and allowing adequate
visibility during transfer. [NOTE: qkylab mission experience indi-
cated no difficulty in handling large masses in ;'ero g; however, the
i01
cross-sectional area of 20" x 25" was considered a realistic limit from
the visibility standpoint.]
(2) llinges designed so that all hinged devices remain
as positioned by the crewmaL_.
(3) Roundededges and corners of packages and containers.
(4) Package fasteners able to withstand prelaunch,
launch, and flight loads and:
(a) Designed to prevent inadvertent operation.
(b) Simply operable with either a bare or a pres-
surized-gloved hand, without requiring extensive astronaut stability
aids. Skylab :rews indicated a preference for magnetic or lift-handle
latches.
(5) Each package marked to indicate:
(a) Proper mounting orientation.
(b) Equipment-peculiar precautions.
(c) Operating instructions, where feasible.
(6) Cameras/film canisters, and other equipment trans-
ferred during EVA, designed to meet the followi:;g requiremerts:
(a) Capability for one-hand operation.
(b) Capability for tethering.
(c) Mounting provisions compatible with equipment
transfel devices.
(7) Package mounting provisions designed to avoid pro-
viding a sp_ce for floating articles to pass behind and/or accumulate.
3. Fli_ht Operation Electrical Constraints
a. Module power provided to experiment interfaces had the
followin G characteristics:
(I) l_o-Wire System. Power was distributed by a two-
,ire system, l_e system did not use module _tructure for return of
¢ _rrent to the power source.
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(2) Grounding. Any one set of negative buses was
referenced to the structure at only one point. The experiment could
not use module structure for return of current to the power source.
The moduleprovided the single-point ground.
(3) Bonding. Electrical bonding and grounding of the
experiment was in accordance with MIL-B-5087, providing a radio fre-
quency ground reference plane, a fault current return path, and a
discharge path for lightning and static charge.
(4) Circuit Protection. All experiment positive
polarity lines of the DC distribution wiring were protected with
circuit breakers or fuses provided by the module. Use of fuses was
minimized.
(5) CrewMating or Demating of Connectors On-Orblt.
The presence of power in the connectors durin S matin8 or dematlng by
the crew was circumvented by design or procedure. Connector design
or application precluded mismsting.
Interfaces.
quirements:
(6) Characteristics of Unregulated 28 V DC Power at
The voltages at module interfaces met the following re-
(a) Bus Noise. The total AC components of the
voltage could not exceed 1.0 volts peak-to-peak for all frequencies
from 20 Hz to 20 _z.
(b) Under and Over Voltage. Under and over
voltage with a duration greater than I0 microseconds and less than
I00 milliseconds could not exceed the limits 28 ! _ by more than 3
volts.
(c) Transients. Transient voltage with a dura-
tion of less than I0 microseconds could not exceed ! 50 volts relative
to the limits 28 ! _-
b. The module provided interface cabling: I) between
sensor ad control panels, and 2) between experiment hardware com-
ponents if the cabling required mechanical support from the module.
c. Experiment electrical design considerations were:
(I) The experiment provided a rapid means of switch-
ing off power under emergency conditions.
(2) The experiment control panel provided a positive
indication of power-on, current level, and power-off status.
Io3
(3) Experinent safety-critical and nonsafety-critical
circuitr" were isolated from each other.
(4) Secondary power sources were provided for experiment
safety-critical functions.
(5) Experiment safety-critical electrical components
were protected against the effects of liquid leakage, moisture, con-
densation, vibration, arcing contacts and corona.
(6) Experiment electrical disconnects were loc_ted
separately from hazardous fluid disconnects, were qualified as ex-
plosion-pr_f and would not have power applied to the connection
during or after disconnect.
(7) If batteries were used, they were designed to
prevent danger of explosion under any cox_iticms.
(8) Cabling was placed so that it could not be sub-
jected to loads for which it was not designed (e.g., use as a hand-
or foot-hold).
(9) Use of high-voltage systems was minimized.
d. The design of an experiment was required to satisfy
EMI criteria that met the following minimum requirements: the oper-
ation of the exp_ iment in any mode (powered or unpowered) could not
degrade the performance of another subsystem relative to that sub-
system's performance criteria. The hardware would satisfy the single-
point ground requirement and meet EMI NIL-STD-461. Verification of
this was required during the qualification development phase, and
evidence of meeting these criteria was included in the ADP.
e. Pyrotechnics
(I) Use of pyrotechnics by experiments was minimized
and required approval by NASA.
(2) Pyrotechnic initiators could not be susceptible
to ignition in the EMI environment of the module.
(3) The arming cf pyrotechnic devices was protected
against accidental operation. Arming and safety were clearly indicated.
(4) Pyrotechnic exhaust products were contained or
controlled to prevent ignition of combustibles.
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(5) The pyrotechnic logic circuits received power
from a source other than the pyrotechnic initiation batteries.
(6) Pyrotechnic devices required for safety were
designed to allow verification.
(7) Pyrotechnic firing circtits were protected from
electrostatic charge buildup.
(8) Sequence logic and pyr echnic firing circuits were
required to be at least "fail-safe/fail-s_ a".
4. F!£_ht Operati_ Controls and DiSpla_ _tra_ts
a. Circuit l_rotectlon. Circuit breaker devices had manual
reset c4pa_ility aad a visual display of position.
b. Panel _gh_ Console floodlighting, eleetrolumi-
nescent panel lighting, and numeric displays were controllable in
intensity steps at the panel or console. Lamp testing capability was
provided for panel displays. Radiation or luminescent type paint was
not allowed.
c. Emergency Lighting. The module provided the manual
or automatic emergency lighting of the work areas. This requirement
could be satisfied through the use of overhead emergency lighting.
d. Automatic/_nual Override. Controls and displays pro-
vided the capability for manual override of critical automatic systems
to assure mission success or crew safety.
e. Ground/Crew Operations. Experiment displays for ground
and crew controlled systems reflected true system status. [NOTE: Some
problems were encountered during the missions with inaccurate or un-
reliable film and magnetic tape usage indicators.]
f. Pyrotechnics Control. The flight crew was the sole source
of control of all pyrotechnic devices required for on-orbit operations.
g. Redundancy Control. Crew controls were provided for
selection of redundant system capabilities.
h. All controls and displays were recessed or provided with
"bump-proof" switch guards, especially for panels located in high-traffic
areas.
i. Operation of experiment controls was limited to one-man
operation, i.e., no single experiment operation required two cre_nen
simultaneously.
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.j. 'Fhe crew ,,1onitored tile progress of each experiI_lent
obserwltion and were provided tile capability to terminate observation
due to lack of d_ita qual[t'/.
k. Instruments provided automatic calibration, but pro-
vided crew capability to it_[tiate a calibration pn_cedure.
1. Where feasible (and not excessively time-consu,_ling),
crew capability to perform a function effectively was utilized instead
of automating the function.
m. Experiments were designed to operate in a powered-down
,node during launch and reentry phases. If any erperiment operation
was required during these phases, it was monitored a,_ controlled from.
the module.
5. Fli_ht Operati_ Crew Interf3ce Constraints
a. To the maximum extent possibles crew mobility/stability
aids for experiments were preinstalled.
b. "I1ae crewmen were alerted to any existing or impending
crew hazard condition by an appropriate signal to the Caution and Warn-
ing System.
c. Attachment provisions for morn,ring the car_y-in equip-
_ent, instruments and devices, if any, were preinstalied in the module
prior to launch.
d. All launch-stowed experiment equipment was stowed such
that it could be obtained without }.JVA.
e. 'lhe module generally provided the following crew aids
and restraints:
(I) Provisions for locomotion and restraint were
located throughout the module to facilitate crew movement between
various work stations.
(2) Both permanent and portable general restraint
devices were provided, to allow the crew to adequately perform acti-
vities at the various crew stations.
(3) Adequate foot restraints were provided each crew-
,nan for use while performing normal or contingency tasks.
f. i!\'A tasks, including contingencies, could not require
more than two crewmen (i.e., at least one crewman re_naining inside the
spacecraft at all times).
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g. A manual backup modewas provided for all mechanical,
EFA_and film magazine transfer devices.
h. EVAcrew work stations at the experiment were illumi-
nated to 5 ft-lamberts minimum.
i. 1_e moduleprovided the capability to turn off all
external lights, either by crew or ground command,while performing
light-sensitive experiments.
j. Human Engineering. MSFC-STD-267 or MIL-STD-1472 were
applied as guides for standards and practices for _'-mman Engineering
desf_n.
6. Other _t O-perati_ _tra_
_t
(1) Nonflmmmble structural materials were required
in the module environment. Interior walls and secondary structure
were constructed of self-extinguishing material.
(2) To the extent necessary to ensure crew safety,
materials selected for use in habitable areas were nonexplosive, non-
flammable, nontoxic, and low-outgassing under normal operational con-
ditions as well as under conditions of depressurization.
(3) Experiment radiation sources required NASA EDC
approval for usage.
b. Contami_ation Control
(I) Shields
(a) Contamination-sensitive elements were located
to take maximum advantage of natural shielding by the vehicle structure.
(b) Contamination-sensitive elements were shielded
from any direct impingement of the attitude control system or venting
contaminants, unless such shielding would be detrimental to the opera-
tion of the contamination-sensitive element.
(2) Covers
(a) All optical instruments exposed to the external
environment were protected from contamination during non-data-taking
periods by movable covers over the instrument aperture.
(b) Instrument covers were designed so that the
most probable failure modes were in the open position. A backup
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L(3) YlaLeria[ SeLection. ALL materials u._:ed in con-
structton of experiment and module hardware were evaluated for out-
gassing and dusting characteristic::, tl_e following specifications
were applicable:
(a) Nater£aI Outgassing Control. ;_taterials se-
lection conformed to the requil_er_nts of the program specifications
(e.g. _ 50M02447, ATM ,_terlal C_mt.-ol for Contam£natiou Due to C_t-
gasstng).
(b) MJteriai Dusting Control. AII mmterials _re
selected for minimum dusting, pa_Mering, or flaking characteristics.
_4here no acceptable material to perform the [unction was available,
covers or coatings were used to contain the dusting products_ or other
protective means (such as filters_ were provided for reduct _.on of dust
products entering the cabin or external atmo._phere,
L4) l_'het-ever pratt{cat, mirrors, lenses, prisms,
windows and other instrument opt-ical elements that were expected to
be degraded by cont,lmination were de:;igned :;o thalt ti:ey could l_e
pt'l'iodic,lll\" ropl,lct'd b\" the cr,-w will! ,i !'p,!rt, • lt,:nent.
L!_) !loctric hL',ltel-s o1_ wimlows, lou_;cs .Ind ::lill'or_;
weft' u,,:cd wht, rt" pr.lctical to ',,aintain the optical t, lt':ut, nt :it ;tn elo-
\'dtt'd [t'!?Ipt'l'dttlle i;; el'act" [o t_lt'\'t'll[ _.'Oll[,ll:!i,l,tl/[- depogition, or :o
periodically hcat the optical elt,,',,ont V_,,indow) to drive oil accumu-
lated illl-el-l_a I Colldt'll:qglt iol_.
_t_) Photograph it: lil,x was p._cka.t;t,d in canister.; to
reduce pos,qible contamination effects prior to camera lending. "re-
mission film testin_ revealed alia[ certain film tvpes (in pal-ticttlelr,
Schulman tyi,t,s_ non-overcoa_ed) are susceptible to seVel't" 17ogging _.n
the prose_+¢¢' of lion-anodized aluminum or copper; these _:_aterlals should
be avoided in design o[ film <retiRe containers.
(7) Venting and i_traping
(a) l,_a',;te storage tat_ks wt, rc el ,tdequatc :;i;:e
to allow ,t :lini:utl:n el one ,_rbit _,-: :lCcu"atl_tt ion 1,t, tvat,et_ dur;p,a. (l'l_e
¢tt'_:[?',ll ,_OAI to >:tOl'C All liquid wil:;tt'< IOl I!:t' I'll[ 11"¢,' t',l_t''/tt {,lll,II
:'t'tI[Od W,l'; ,tt't/t,I] :\" .t,'Ixiovcd.)
!:!i_
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(b) h'aste vents were positioned as remotely as
possible from sensitive surfaces and were directed so that minimum
impingement occurred on any module components.
(c) Nozzle orifice design and discharge pressure
were chosen to provide the minimum practical cone angle pattern for
the discharge stream. Waste dribble at the beginning and end of a
dump was minimized.
(d) Solid waste was packaged and stored wherever
possible. If dumping was required, all solid waste was dumped into
the waste tank in packaged form. Dumps were timed to occur between
operations of critical experi_ts.
(8) To a_old ccmtamln_tlc_, dry lubrication was the
preferred method for mechan£sms exposed to space.
a. General Co_stralnts
(I) Experiments were Installed in the module prior to
Installation of the module on the launch vehicle.
(2) All subsystems included provisions for deactiva-
tion and monitoring required to assure personnel and hardware safety.
(3) 111e experiments were designed to allow integration,
checkout, operation, refurbishment and maintenance activities to be
performed in either horizontal or vertical poqttitvn.
(4) All hardware was capable of satisfying atad main-
taining Class I00,000 cleanliness as a minimum.
b. Mechanical Constraints
(I) Interface cables and fluid lines were of suffi-
cient length (service loop) to allow Interface connections to be made
before mechanical mating of the experiment
(2) Interface fluid lines nnd electrical cables were
designed so that individual cables or lines could be removed without
disrupting the integrity of adjacent lines.
(3) Transportation and handling equipment waq designed
to ensure that flight structures w-ere not sub}ected to transportation
loads _:lore severe than flight de,;ign condititms.
i
(4) Dt,_ign of the experL:_ent ::liniPKzed prob[e_us due to
,lois ture condensation and dripping.
(5) []_e design and routing of flight and ¢;SI*:cables
and fluid lines was such that these cables and fluid lines would not
pose any obstruction to module egress or be subject to damage.
(6) _ere possible in the design of tile experiment.
consideration was given to using captive-type fasteners for internal
mounting of experiment components, to preclude loss el attachment
hardware.
(7) Experiment therr_l control subsystems were designed
so that constant or periodic circulation of fluids was not required
during periods of power-down or storage, and to provide ease in the
servicing of fluids including fill, drain, and dry operations.
c. Electrical Constraints
(i) Instrumentation system capabilities and sensors
required to support ground test activities were included in the flight
hardware wherever practical, i_ order to minimize the requirements for
separate ground support equipment.
(2_ Where feasible, pyrotechnic devices were category
B as defined in CP-469, Explosive Safety llandbook (i.e., _'Category B
electric-explosive devices ,_re those which will not, in themselves or
by initiating a chai1_ of events, cau:_c [_iury t_, people or damage to
property"_.
i_. _;round ,qupport Equip_lent
1. Uene ra I
_. Onboard n,onitoring and control ot ti_ose operation:; which
might be hazardou,q to ground test personnel were capable of being moni-
tored and controlled by d.qt:,
b. G,qE required for support o/ ground testing_ monitoring,
and servicing act[vitie_ was ::_inimized by making maximum use of tile
flight subsystems to support these function_. _;gl: related to ground
_ervicing included pruvision_ for external excitation voltage and
monitoring capability, to preclude the necessity oi: internal power-up
for these activities.
c. Dt,velop'_icnt te_ting el ,:_! w,l: rc_!uirt_d oulv when it wa<
on an engineering analysis or acceptance verification to establish func-
tional performance.
d. Qualfication testing was accomplished on an exception
basis only, for those items of GSEwhich cuuLd not be qualified by
analysis or similarity.
e. Experiment-specific GSEwas provided by tile ED. l_is
GSEwas designed to interface with standardized facility support inter-
faces for power, fluids, etc.
f. The design of the GSEtook into consideration the existing
facilities' capabili=ies at the module integration site, launch site,
and any other users' facilitles_ as avplicable. Every effort was ,aade
to provide identical sets of GSE for use at the various test locations.
g. }4eans wereprovided for controlled movement of hardware
that was not easily hand-manipulated (e.g., tracks, _Jid-s or other
restraining devices with spacing and friction controls), to minimize
the potential of damage to adjacent equipment and hazards to personnel.
h. The experiments were protected as necessary during all
handling operations.
i. Containers for transporting hazardous material had ade-
quate handles and lids and indicated when ti_ey were positively closed.
Also, _asy-to-recognize markings identifying contents, information or
special handling notes were provided.
2. Design and Cons truc_t$on. GSE design adhered to known
state-of-th6-art and to the selection of proven parts, materials, _md
processes to tl:e degree practical. "lhe design was restricted to the
accomplishment of the t;SE requirements.
a. Operation Periods. After adjust,_ent, t;Sl: w:_s desigtmd
to operate for a period commensurate with the function being performed,
without requiring readjustment of controls when set for specific opera-
ting conditions.
b. Redundant Elec_rical Circuits. Redundant electrical
circuits in GSE were not routed through the same connector.
c. Operating Power. GSE was designed to be compatible
with the power existing at the facilities to be used.
d. Racks and Consoles. The design of subasse_lblv racks
and consoles included entry access for cables ,_nd cooling _v_te,'m that
were cowpatible with the facilities in which they were, _o b, _, i.
ill
t
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¢,. l'luid ((:as ;,nd l,iqqid)_t. 'llu, (::ill n_,cess_rv to _uppore
fluid .qyste,n>_ transfcrrc.d, condit.,oned ond/or .qtored LIlt' fluid stlit-
able for tilt ultLmat,' s_y.qtelll usage.
t. Cleanl Lne_. (;Nl'_ w/is _. s ignt.,l, _,_mllactured, assembled,
;t,ld handled in a manner such that its presence and/or operation in the
;_pplicable clean areas and flight vehicles would not violate the cle;_n-
liness levels maintained therein, hi cases where (;S!i was used for the
cransportation, handling or removal of experiments, the (:SI" was designed
to pcovide adequate mean:; of contamiration control consistent with the
cleanliness levels of the module involved.
g. Test Provisions. GSE was designed so that failure
within the GSE or interruption of power would not cause failure o.-
damage to the flight hardware being tested. Conversely, failure of
the flight hardware being tested could not cause failme or damage to
the GSE.
h. Single Point Failures. GSE was designed so that a
single point failure would not affect crew or ground personnel safety,
cause loss of flight hardware, prevent or compromise accomplishment of
a primary mission objective or caase a launch to be rescheduled.
i. Standa'-d Parts. NASA, Air Force-Navy (AN), Military
Standard (MS) or joint Air Force-Navy (.1AN) :_tandard parts were used
in (;SI._ wherever applicable.
j. _:orrosion l'rovention. ,qctals u_,.t in (iSll w('re of _he
.........................
corrosion-resistant type or suit bly treated to t-esi_;t any corrosive
conditions likely to be met 'n manufacture, a'_sc, mb|y, testing, servic-
ing, storage or normal service u_e.
k. Klectromagnetic Interference. Electrical and electronic
(;SIC was designed to pertorm as speciiied when operating either inde-
pendently or in conjunction with other equipment with which an elec-
trical connection was made, or which ,nay have been installed nearby;
and would not, in itself, be a source of interference which might
adversely affect the operation ef other equipment. (:%E was designed
to meet the requirements and limits of MIL-STD-461. (Reference
HI L-S TI)-462 ).
1. Single Point l'lectrScal t;rounding. All units (racks,
consoles, enclosures) using-.or-generating electrical energy were pro-
vided with an accessible and clearly marked ground stud for single
point grounding purposes. 'lhe DC resistance between any ,,-,._-tal part
ot the units (covers, lids, hinged doors, el c./ and tim ground stud
could not be ,_reater tilan 1(;() _i]li_h,:m.
LL2
t ....
3. Maintainability. Maintainability criteria for GSE were
_pecified to satisfy the following requirements:
a. Accessibility. GSE w_s designed to permit ease of
_ccess to accomplish maintenance functions, i.e., inspection, servic-
ing, adjustment, calibration, or repair. Inspectionp maintenance or
test locations were identified _nd easily accessible.
b. Disassembly Provisions. GSE was designed to permit
ready disconnection, removal and replacement of major assemblies or
components through use of modular construction design principles.
c. Environmental Requlre_nts. GSE was capable of success-
fully performing the required functlc_s during or after being subjected
to the natural and induced envlromnents encountered during esch of the
modes of transportation, handling, operation snd storage.
d. Transportability. Wherever possible, GSE was designed
to withstand handling and transportation environments without the nec-
essity of special containers, or the necessity of monitoring critical
environments to verify that design limits had not been exceeded.
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EXPERIMENT TEST ING
A. Development Phase
I. Requirements. Experiment hardware acceptance was contin-
gent upon prior verification that the end item would meet each technical
(performance, interface or design) requirement of the applicable EIS.
VerifJ=ation could be accomplished either by assessment or by test (or
a combination of the two). Commonly used assessment methods were:
o Similarity: Used s_hen it could be shown that the
article w_s identical or substantially similar in
design, manufacturing processes, and quality con-
trol to another article that had previoEsly been
qualified to equivalent or more stringent criteria.
o Analysis: Used in lieu of testing whenever it
could be shown by generally accepted analytical
techniques that an article would meet the appli-
cable t_L,,_! _.. _ _o
_ _I_ eme,._.
o Inspection; Used when it could be shown that
inspection techniques were adequate to assure
that the article would meet the applicable t_ch-
nical requirements. Inspection was used to veri-
fy construction features, compliance to drawings,
workmanship, and physical condition of the article.
Demonstration: Used when it could be shown that
demonstration was adequate to assure that the
article would meet the applicable technical r_-
quirements. Demonstration was used to verify
such requirements as service and access, handling.
convenience and ease of operation.
o Validation of Records: Used when it could be
sho_ that records would substantiate manufac-
turing processes, materials, traceability or
test i_istory performance.
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L_,c, ss,lrx to ,iccompLisi_ \cl-iiicat ioz_ I_\ test in,,.',. I'_'st pro,',ram_ \,vr,'
d,'si:._,d to avoid duplic,ltio_: _I_l,it,_ vcqui, l, t,_L\ lh_' llli_II.l,llll.Illl [u'S[_
:_,cu.ssar\:, subject to co_sid, vati_ons ot ilatdwarc cL'i_t iuaLit\ and com-
?l_.>,it\. l'hc i_nI kucncc ol tlu, i_ardw;lrc C,riticalit\' k:atc},,or} (scc
%,,c, i,>_l N) \,,is to cmpi_,tsi,:L, vcri. i lcdl io_ b\ LcsL Ic, r l;at,:_',or) I hard-
uAL'c, b} combi, nali. ons ol Lest and o.sscssmcnL [or Calc_-ory 2_ and bx
,tssuSsmetlL ro. Lhcr than t,'St (,where tea3ibLt2) for Catc,Kor.i.es 3 arid A.
2. _cst _ypcs
a. Dcve[opmen_ _ests. Dcvtalopmcnt tests, a_ necessary,
were performed to acquire data to support the design and development
process; to verify /easibility of the design approach by evaluatkng
hardware performance, design margins and/or failure modes under simu-
lated or actual environmental conditions; and to p_ovide confidence in
the ability o[ the hardware to pass qualification testa by verifying
selected performance/design requirements. Hardware used for develop-
mc_t testing was ruprcsentativc o[, but not necessarily identical to,
the ftigi_t experiment hardware. A Dew'lopment Test Specification was
prepared by the ED for each development test and submitLed for EI_
review. |'cst proccdurcs atld a report for each developm_ent twst were
prepared hv the t-.'D :rod madw aw_itable at appropriat_c dcw'topmcnl rot. Lo-
s[oily S .
(4) Tests to determine whether the qual.tfication test
hardware was performing within specification tolerances _erc conducted
atttcr each environmental exposure, and during tile exposure' period it
the flight hardware was required to operate in that environment.
(5) Qualification tests were performed under strict
control of environments and test procedures. Adjustment or tuning of
qualification test hardware was not permitted during tests unless it
was normal for in-service operation.
(6) Where redundancy in design e.xisted, the qualifica-
ti_ tests assured that each redundancy was qualified.
(7) If the design configuration or manufacturlng pro-
cesses were changed after acceptance tests on qualification test hard-
ware were initiated, any differences existing between the qualification
test hardware and the flight and backup hardware invalidated verifica-
tion and required repeating the qualification test.
(8) Qualification tests were to be completed prior
to the delivery of flight or backup hardware.
(9) Where considered necessary, components of qualifi-
cation test hardware were disassembled after testing was completed, and
inspected to determine margins of safety and potential failure modes.
(i0) Types of Test Environments: Humidity; salt fog;
high temperature (Ib0°F on Skvlab); low temperature (-40°F on Skylab);
shock; fungus; positiw' pressure (for hermetically scaled equipment);
acceleration; vibration (sinusoidal resonance search, sinusoidial
cycling, and random vibration); acoustic noise; altitude or space simu-
lation; and atmospheric compatibility (oxy'gen, nitrogen, or t_,.o-gas en-
v i ronmc n t ).
c. Acceptance Tests. Acceptance tests were conducted to
verify the performance and configuration of each experimevt hardware
end item at the time of its acceptance by the Government or delivery
to another NASA center. The ED prepared (subject to El)(: review) an
Acceptance Test Specification, defining the limits and methods for
each test, and Acceptance Test Procedures based on this specification.
Data sheets were prepared showing the rL.sults o[ all acccpt,mcL_ tests
per formed.
General requirements for acceptance testing were:
(1) Environmental tests x,,crc included in acccpta_:c,.
tests in instances where a type of manulaclurin!: tlaw could not bc
dot coted b\' tnspcet ton or other nondcst ructi vc means (c.:.,. , collducl -
ill}; a vibration test on clcctronic cquipmc_ll Io find [atilt\, solder
.ioi,1 t s) .
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(.Z) fhw g,:w'rJ.t_, durat [on, dud numb,.'r o1_ tests were
constraitlcd SO ._s not to rcsulL i.F_ ovcrsLrcgsi]lg or dcu, radation ot the
hardware per£ot'nlancc capabilit_ .
(3) Where possible, all normal, alternate, redundaut
and emergency operational modes were tested.
(4) Tile hardware was calibrated and aligned prior to
conducting acceptan_.e tests.
(5) Acceptance tests were performed under stric= con-
trol of environments and test procedures. Adjustment or tuning of
hardware was not permitted during acceptance testing unless it was
r_orual for in-service operation.
(6) Any repairs, modi[ica_ions or replacements after
completion of acceptance tests required retesting to assure the accept-
ability of the change.
B. Integration Phase
i. Requirements. integration tests were performed to w_rify
those interface requirements that could not b_ formally verified at
the individual experiment hardware fowl. General integration test
requirements were originally baselincd in ti]c ERD, including an ex-
periment hardware flow diagram from the ED ihrou_:l: _i_c module integra-
tion tllld launch sites, types ot tests tit each ,;'1_. a,ld associated spe-
cial constraints, fhesL requirements and constraints were later amp!i-
fit'd and updated in tlw KiTRS docu,,wnts, wt_ici_ rclil_.ctcd concurrence
ol ai[ _lgCllcies involved (i.c , tlw IgD, i:bR_, EIC, Modulc Dcvclopment
Center and Contractor, as applicabl_:). The Module D_'vclopmcnt Center/
Uo_i:acto,- then d_wloped the dL, tailcd TCRSD, tow'ring tut_,gration
CcStin:- at both nloduie ¢1:1d i2;m,h sit_:s, fhc I'CRSDs contained dctai led
requirements for each twst, criteria lot .tudgi,,g t!:. ._uccess of the
test, and any special constraints. From thest_ detailed requirements,
the site responsible tot conducting the test prepared detailed test
procedures to satisfy each req,irement. At module integration sit_s,
satisfaction of the requirements was a constraint on acccptallce of the
module. At the launch site, satisfaction of the requirements was a
constraint on £1ight readiness.
La. Receiving and Inspection (R&I). Whenever hardware
was delivered to a site, the cquipmenL and its accompanying data pack-
age were inspected for completeness and any evidence of physical damage.
Tlle hardware was not actually operated during R&I unless there was an
indication of physical damage during shipment.
b. Pre-Installation Tests (PIT_. Following R_I, the hard-
ware was delivered to a clean room (normally class i00,000), where it
was set up and tested using experiment GSE. Testing was limited to
that needed either to verify that baseline calibration data remained
valid or to determine a new data baseline prior to mating the experiment
to the flight vehicle. _is b_eline data (collected either _uring the
PIT or during the earlier acceptance test at the ED aite) was needed
prior to system testing on board the module for comparison _ data
collected during the module system test, in o_-der to determine the
effect of _le envirorm_nt (electrlcal, _, etc) upo_ the cxperlmen_.
c. Functional-Interface Verification Test (FIV). The objec-
tives of these tests were strictly limited to verification of all inter-
faces with the module. FIV began with verification of mechanical inter-
faces by mounting the experiment in the module. If installation of the
experiment involved a part of the module primary pressure structure, the
seal of the experiment was leak tested following installation. Following
mechanical installation in the module, polarity of the module power input
at the experiment interface was checked. A megger-ohm test was performed
upon th_ experiment prior to electrical mating, to veri_y that the _x-
periment hardware was properly isolat_d from the module and that experi-
ment input impedances met interface requirements. Using a "break-out
box" between the modtlle power cable and the experiment power connector,
measured power was applied to tht _ experiment and calculations wer_ made
to verify the experiment power profile. Following these power checks,
the power connector was mated directly and the experiment was operated
under flight conditions (as far as practicality would permit) to vcrif_
the remaining experiment _lec[rical interfaces. All modes of the ex-
periment operation were not functioned unless an inte_fac_ was involved
that would not be tested otherwise_
d. Integrated Systems Tests. Following successful comple-
tion of all interface verifications of individual _xperiments, integrated
system tests were conducted to verify that experiments and module systems
could play together without degradation of th_ performance of either.
These tests were characterized primarily as el_ctromagnetic compatibili-
ty tests, and were performed utilizing existing flight plans and chLck-
lists, with flight cr_w participation, to the great_st extent possible.
The tests were evaluated by comparison el their data with bas_lin_ _ da[a
provided by the experiment acceptance and/or PiT tests.
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